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Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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CONTENTS

29 September 1993

CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Military Courts Chief Muranov Interviewed [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 27 Aug]	1
Lt-Gen Lebed Elected to Dniester Parliament [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Sep]	2
Program for Work With Junior Officers [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Sep]	2
Siberia: Civil-Military Disputes Over Land Use [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Sep]	3
Problem With Rotation of Russian Officers Into, Out of Transcaucasus [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Sep]	5
Sailors Assigned Police Duties [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Sep]	6

CIS: POLICY

Signals Directorate Reorganized [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Sep]	6
--	---

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Commander-in-Chief Deynekin Comments on Goals, Missions of Reorganization [KRASNYY VOIN 7 Aug]	6
Air Force Recruiting Advertisement [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Aug]	8
Performance, Specifications of 'Universal-1E' Air Defense Radar [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Sep]	10

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

V-Adm Kaisin: Missions, Problems of New Navy [MILITARY NEWS BULLETIN No 7, Jul]	11
Biographical Notes on Senior Commanders [MILITARY NEWS BULLETIN No 7, Jul]	13
Supreme Soviet Investigates Finances of Northern Fleet [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Sep]	15

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Maj-Gen Anokhin Describes ROSTO [MILITARY NEWS BULLETIN No 7, Jul]	16
Motor-Transport Battalion Assists With Harvest [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Sep]	17

STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russo-Ukrainian Efforts To Resolve Economic, Military, Naval Issues	19
Russian Views of Three Major Problems [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 3 Sep]	19
Efforts To Resolve Fate of Black Sea Fleet [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 Sep]	21
Russia-Ukraine Warhead Salvage Agreement [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 22 Sep]	23
'Basic Principles' of Warhead Agreement [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 22 Sep]	24
Missile Maintenance Supervision Agreement [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 22 Sep]	25

BELARUS

Chief of Main Staff Churkin on 'National Extremism' in Military [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Sep]	26
---	----

BALTIC STATES

Latvia's Defense Minister Pavlovskis Interviewed	<i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Sep]</i>	27
--	---------------------------------	----

GENERAL ISSUES

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Reaction to U.S. Revision of FM 100-5	<i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Sep]</i>	30
Pentagon Plan for U.S. Armed Forces Examined	<i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Sep]</i>	31

SECURITY SERVICES

Notes: Border Control Issues	<i>[POGRANICHNIK No 4]</i>	33
Border Troops Commander Nikolayev on Armed Conflict on Periphery	<i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Sep]</i>	35

CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Military Courts Chief Muranov Interviewed

93UM0846A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 27 Aug 93 p 2

[Military Courts Chief Col-Gen Anatoliy Muranov interviewed by unidentified correspondent: "Law: Are Military Courts Impartial?"]

[Text] General-Colonel Anatoliy Muranov, Russian deputy ministry of justice and chief of the Ministry of Justice military courts administration, answers questions from our correspondent.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] Anatoliy Ivanovich, you recently visited the Western Group of Forces and inspected the work of military courts. How does the state of affairs in the Western Group of Forces compare to Russia's internal districts?

[Muranov] Until recently, the situation in the group of forces was comparatively better. And even now, in terms of our indices (conviction rates, law enforcement, maintenance of law and order), the situation there is far better than in our internal military districts. Nevertheless, negative aspects involving thefts and waste of fuel, lubricants, and equipment have begun to manifest themselves in the Western Group of Forces.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] What could you say about charges of corruption in the Western Group of Forces?

[Muranov] We have no materials that the procuracy would, in such instances, forward to a military court. In any event, I am not at liberty to express any viewpoint before a case is tried. Unfortunately, some of our politicians don't abide by this rule.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] The crime situation, according to law enforcement officers themselves, has long since begun to threaten the country's security. I doubt that the army has been spared these problems.

[Muranov] The processes taking place in our country are affecting the state of legality and legal order in the Armed Forces. Specifically, I am most concerned about evasion of military service and thefts of military property.

The paradox, in my view, is that, on one hand, the incidence of evasion of military service has increased, while on the other hand, the number of people prosecuted for this has declined. In 1992, if I am not mistaken, just five people were convicted of authorized leave in the Armed Forces. However, this doesn't mean that just five people evaded service.

There are several causes of this: Heart-broken mothers simply steal their "homesick" sons. And the homes they miss, for example, are in independent states, such as Ukraine or Belarus, where Russian laws are not in force. Although these problems are being solved where

the Central Asian states are concerned, they are not being solved with respect to other countries.

Servicemen are often prompted to leave their military units by violations of procedures for organizing service in the Armed Forces and the declining prestige of military service.

An analysis of crime in the army and navy allows one to conclude that more and more officers and army and navy warrant officers are committing crimes for personal gain.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] In your opinion, is there a link between evasion of service and draft evasion?

[Muranov] I should point out that draft evasion does not come under the jurisdiction of military courts. But there is a link: These crimes ultimately have a negative effect on the country's defense capability. Last year, roughly 30,000 youths evaded a single draft, but only about 300 were convicted. No, I'm not in favor of wholesale punitive measures, but every draftee must know and realize that he will be held accountable for violating the law.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] So is the law bad, Anatoliy Ivanovich?

[Muranov] The law is fine, but the mechanism for enforcing it isn't working. Neither the police, the civilian procuracy, or the courts are addressing this problem. To them, draft evasion is a trifle. But believe me, where ensuring the country's security is concerned, it is no trifle. Unfortunately, only military personnel understand this.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] The prestige of military service has in many ways been affected by inconsistent actions by the parliament, which adopted the law "On the Status of Servicemen" and then "confiscated" some of its articles.

[Muranov] In my opinion, that should not have been done. Laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet are supposed to undergo preliminary study in the departments concerned and cleared with the Ministry of Justice. In some cases, newly adopted laws have no economic base. The law "On the Status of Servicemen," if you take a close look at it, has no economic base where a number of aspects are concerned, now or in the future. And a law without a base works against itself and against the state.

I take this view because the military courts receive numerous complaints from servicemen who point out that laws have been adopted, but where are the benefits and rights they provide? What is the court to do in this situation? Adopt a decision based on the law? But then who is going to enforce it and how? The question arises: Why adopt a very promising law when there is no mechanism to enforce it? Why deceive people?

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] Questions, questions, Anatoliy Ivanovich. As I understand it, you would like to see specialists and experts from the ministries and departments concerned take part in drafting laws.

[Muranov] Definitely. Such an approach, in my opinion, would promote successful work on laws that will not go on to just spin their wheels.

Lt-Gen Lebed Elected to Dniester Parliament

93UM0843E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Sep 93 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Gondusov and Anatoliy Kholodnyuk: "General Lebed Has Become a Member of the Dniester Parliament"]

[Text] Tiraspol—Lt-Gen Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the Russian 14th Army, has been elected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Dniester Republic.

More than 80 percent of the Tiraspol residents voted for him in elections held there last Sunday. In an interview granted to journalists, the army commander announced that he would not be a "token general" in the parliament and that he intends actively to influence political processes in the unrecognized republic, including the talks between Tiraspol and Chisinau.

Program for Work With Junior Officers

93UM0843B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Sep 93 pp 1,3

[Interview with Lt-Gen Georgiy Ivanovich Shpak, chief of staff of the Volga Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Oleg Bedula and Col Andrey Bondarenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent with the Volga Military District press center: "Will Lieutenant Ivanov Become a General? That Depends Upon His Commanders"]

[Text] Our correspondents interviewed Lt-Gen Georgiy Shpak, chief of staff of the Volga Military District, on the first comprehensive program for working with young officers.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Georgiy Ivanovich, the affairs of the young officers—their service, life and professional development—are discussed at just about every session of the district military council. Is this problem so acute in the district, or, to be blunt, is there nothing else to discuss?

[Shpak] Have you noticed how the lines in the reception rooms of the chiefs of district staff directorates and departments have grown younger? They are made up not of colonels but of lieutenants, senior lieutenants and captains. This was never the case in the past. A lieutenant did not even know the way to the district headquarters. This was because everything was clear to the school graduate. Just put your all into the job, try as

hard as you can, and, as they say, honor will come to you. Take a look at the faces in these lines, today, though. You will see uncertainty, apprehension and apathy. They are for certain the faces of some unknown lieutenants Ivanov, however, destined perhaps to become generals in 20 years or so.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In that case, what are the problems of the young officers?

[Shpak] Everyone has his troubles, one might say. At the same time they all bear the common mark of today's unsettled and difficult military service. Just look at how previously unheard-of things have become everyday affairs: officer guard details, an acute shortage of personnel, increased demands of the quality of the training process but a reduction of the time available to prepare for and organize it.... Added to this are the lack of proper living arrangements.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But hundreds of graduates—judging from my own experience, people devoted to the army and the service and prepared to overcome all difficulties—joined the district forces in the past just as they have this year.

[Shpak] Unfortunately, there should have been far more. While in 1992 the military schools shorted us by one fourth of the graduates we requested, this year the shortage is 52 percent. With respect to the attitude toward the military service in general, you are apparently correct. In any case I can say with certainty that we are over the big hump. The number of members desiring to leave the service has fallen drastically in the past 6 months. We have noticed the turning point and are attempting to turn it into a stable trend. This is the purpose of the comprehensive new program for working with the young officers.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is it? What does it consist of?

[Shpak] To describe it officially, it is a matter of involving all district departments, services and directorates without exception in the work with young officers. A sort of combining of efforts to increase interest in and loyalty to the service. The shaping of what I would call officer qualities: honor, devotion to duty and civic responsibility. To put it more simply, it is true concern for and attention to the new generation.

We polled young officers in a tank division which arrived in the Volga region from the ZGV [Western Group of Forces] on what their predominate feelings were. More than half of them answered: Apprehension, irritation and uncertainty. As a result, every second one has requested a discharge. Later, when I met with these officers, I tried to find out just what was the cause of this hopelessness. Lack of faith that the social problems would soon be resolved, inability to change the situation.... But there is something else entirely different. The youth are terribly depressed by the ignorance of their superiors and by the fact that they

are loaded down with totally irrelevant assignments. They all say with a single voice that they would simply like to have decent commanders. In what sense? Why, in the sense of the best traditions of the officer corps: Paternal commanders, mentors, educators, men of honor, men of their word; strict, but fair and intelligent. We discussed the matter in the military council and concluded that there is an enormous reserve, that nothing extraordinary is needed.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But, Georgiy Ivanovich, a sociological survey conducted by the personnel directorate has also indicated the importance of the material aspect of the situation in the officers' service.

[Shpak] And how! I can go even further. The material aspect, actually out-and-out need, is forcing young officers to look for additional earnings. There are cases, most unfortunately, at the Samara, Orenburg, Ulyanovsk and Saratov garrisons in which lieutenants and captains are unloading railcars, guarding things or hiring out as bodyguards. And just about half of those discharged are going into business. People in the forces cannot understand why the Supreme Soviet and the government are not giving serious thought to all of this.

We are not throwing up our hands, though. And whenever things depend upon us, we are achieving something. In the social area, let us say. By decision of the district commander, all of this year's unmarried graduates are being housed in well-appointed dormitories. Just lately 39 apartments have been allocated for the families of lieutenants, as well as 27 modular units. Right now, we are engaging in an unprecedented experiment. At the suggestion of Col-Gen A. Sergeyev, we have decided to abandon the designs for buildings with two-room apartments for young families. Married lieutenants will immediately be assigned three-room apartments; whenever possible, four-room apartments.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We are talking mostly about "down-to-earth" matters. But poor platoon commander Ivanov is hardly going to become a good general. What do you have to say about the purely professional preparation of the young officers?

[Shpak] Unfortunately, for some of them the process of "establishing themselves" professionally is drawn out due to poor methodological skills and gaps in the technical and tactical training. This is particularly true of graduates of the Vladikavkaz Combined-Arms School, the Kazan Tank School and the Yekaterinburg Artillery School. We are therefore vigorously employing methods assemblies, conferences, evening question-and-answer meetings and competitions for best in field of specialization. Added to this is work performed to expand the world outlook and raise the intellectual level of the officers in general. And we are working, so to speak, to forestall these deficiencies in cadets at schools within our district, using district staff officers and officers in the field. This is producing definite results. Every tenth one of last year's graduates has moved up a position, 15

lieutenants have been promoted ahead of schedule, and the number of platoon and company commanders occupying those positions five or more years has dropped.

Incidentally, speaking of the effectiveness of the entire comprehensive system, we believe that it is precisely the increased attention devoted to the youth which accounts in great part for a 70-percent drop in the number of crimes, incidents and gross disciplinary infractions among their ranks.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And one last question—with your permission, a personal one. You recently gave the hand of your daughter in marriage to an airborne officer. As a father, do you believe in a better future for the Russian military, for those people who are linking their lives with it today?

[Shpak] I do. As father, general and citizen all. Both in the army, and in that still unknown Lieutenant Ivanov who has it so difficult today but who will someday for certain become a general in an army which is capable, powerful and respected by the people. Otherwise, what are all of us exerting ourselves, working, living for... today?

Siberia: Civil-Military Disputes Over Land Use

93UM0843C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Sep 93 p 2

[Article by Lt-Col Aleksandr Sekachev with the Siberian Military District press center and Maj Aleksandr Beklich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "They 'Took Away' an Airfield at Berdsk and a Range Near Krasnoyarsk With the Permission, So to Speak, of Our Own Administration"]

[Text] Relations between the military and local residents have suddenly become strained in Berdsk, a satellite city of Novosibirsk. The territory of a military airfield located within the city limits had become a bone of contention. By decision of Vitaliy Mukha, oblast administrative head, and with the acquiescence of city officials, an area of 142 hectares was turned over to city residents for the construction of bungalow-style houses without the consent of the SibVO [Siberian Military District]. Pleased with the generosity of the local authorities, the Berdsk residents wasted no time in taking over the airfield, after paying a round sum for the planning work. The more enterprising have already hauled in construction materials, ignoring the protests of the military serving there. Arguments by the command element of the Siberian Military District that an air unit should be housed there were not taken into consideration even at the oblast administration level. Furthermore, it was explained at air force headquarters of the Siberian Military District, the Berdsk administration practically ordered the military to halt all engineering work there in order not to hamper the city in the "implementation of its housing program."

Nor did a meeting between representatives of the oblast and city administrations and officers in the Siberian Military District's KEU [billeting directorate] resolve the problem. According to Col Gennadiy Filipyev, chief of the billeting department of the Siberian Military District's KEU, the situation today is such that constraining conditions have been set for the district: either move to the other part of the territory all of the equipment from the unit being withdrawn along with all the attached services, which goes against all the instructions, turning the airfield into a cluttered dump and creating conditions conducive to flight accidents, or develop an area in an open field, build access roads, hard-surface them and erect other communication lines at its own expense to support the vital activities and functioning of the airfield. We regard assertions by Aleksandr Zinchenko, head of the Berdsk administration, that the city does not intend to thwart plans for withdrawing military personnel of the Russian Army from foreign parts and accepting them here as nothing other than an exercise in rhetoric.

A look at documents available at the Siberian Military District's KEU showed the deliberate "privatization" by local authorities of land belonging to the Ministry of Defense. Col-Gen Viktor Kopylov, commander of the Siberian Military District, informed the oblast administration in advance that units were to be withdrawn to there. So they knew that the airfield was going to be needed by the military. The district also mentioned the fact that the airfield was to be used for military needs during the inventorying of the land in 1992. Furthermore, a decree issued by the Russian Federation's government on 12 May 1992 called for the basing of several air subunits on that sector. However, the well-known principle that one is his own boss, was obviously more important to officials in Novosibirsk Oblast than their desire to observe the letter of the law and common sense.

Unfortunately, this incident was not the first either in Novosibirsk Oblast or in Siberia. Upon acquiring unlimited independence, the local authorities of Siberian cities and rayons apparently came to conclude that the easiest way to solve the problem of a usable land shortage was at the army's expense. They began taking over ranges, training centers, airfields, the grounds of depots and land belonging to military sovkhozes. The justification was simple to the point of triteness: The military, they said, were not using the land for its intended purpose. We have a situation in which combat training plans had barely had to be curtailed for a certain period of time due to a personnel shortage, when the idle territory drew the attention of those who have nothing against making a good profit. The Siberian Military District had just acquired permission to develop 38 hectares of the idled range territory for individual housing construction, when 15 hectares of the land was withdrawn and placed into the oblast reserve by decision of the Novosibirsk Oblast administration. The district was faced with a fait accompli

and ordered to vacate the territory. It was as though the oblast administration was unaware of the fact that the Land Code of the Russian Federation does not provide for unilateral actions going counter to a land-user's interests. The oblast procurator supported the claims of the military. Nonetheless, justice prevailed only after appeals were submitted to a court of arbitration.

According to Col Grigoriy Kuyan, chief of the district KEU, local authorities have begun disregarding the Land Code of the Russian Federation considerably more frequently, basing their actions on the law on local self-government. This was also the basis for attempts by the Novosiberians to take 516 hectares of land away from the Siberian Military District's airmen at the Tolmachevo military airfield. The area was occupied, by the way, by airfield maintenance and auxiliary services supporting the combat training of the airmen. Local authorities in Krasnoyarsk Kray went even further, taking around 3,500 hectares of the Siberian Military District's range territory for individual construction and for orchard and gardening cooperatives. The gardening enthusiasts who received plots of land just a few dozen meters from an area used for target practice are hardly going to be pleased. The only "harvest" to be gathered there consists of bullets, mines and missiles.... Who will take responsibility for the disaster which could occur there at any time because of the adjacent danger? And how does one explain the "independence" exercised by the administration of Altay Kray in determining that a training center was not needed by one of the garrisons. The willful decision was carried out, and the unit was deprived of 1,800 hectares.... The military have been waiting a long time for the promised compensation in the form of a plot of land for a training center in another area, and it would appear that they are never going to get it.

There are indeed a number of usable land areas in the district which are not presently being used for their direct purpose involving combat training. The district has already turned part of them over to the civilian economy. Another part has been used for the construction of housing for servicemen by decision of Viktor Kopylov, commander of the Siberian Military District. Land there has also been allocated for use as gardens by the officers and warrant officers. In short, the district is resolving issues of social protection for the servicemen with available resources and not standing at the door of local authorities with outstretched hands. What is more, the military inform local authorities of every such move and try to take their interests into account. In most cases, unfortunately, the people in shoulder boards cannot expect reciprocity, and their concern over instances of confiscation of usable land serving military needs, which have become an everyday occurrence of late, is perfectly understandable.

If this continues, in the foreseeable future local authorities will apparently begin privatizing also military supplies and even combat equipment. Right now that

too is sometimes not being used for its direct purpose. It stands idle in the pools and parking areas. Is this not reason enough?

There is obviously little point in trying to get the officials to be reasonable. It is a matter of competence on the part of the lawmakers. The confusion in land legislation could totally deprive the military units of training facilities and result in the curtailment of training programs and even of social protection for military personnel.

Problem With Rotation of Russian Officers Into, Out of Transcaucasus

93UM0843D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Lt-Col Aleksandr Agafonov, Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus: "There Is No Future, and the Service Is Not a Joy to Russian Officers in the Transcaucasus Who Have Been Unable To Wait Long Enough for Their Promised Replacements"]

[Text] The most serious problem for the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus is perhaps that of replacing officers in the interior districts. The last scheduled replacement in the Transcaucasus took place in 1991. Replacements were promised this year as well. Nothing has come of the promises, however, even though a directive issued by the commander in chief of the Ground Troops called for 60 percent, or 160 officers, to be replaced in the GRVZ [Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus] by 1 September.

"For our part, everything required for the rotation has been done," Maj-Gen V. Sheykin, chief of the personnel department of the GRVZ, feels. "We sent the requisition list to Moscow in good time. When it was signed, we filled out the recommendations for the officers listed without delay."

As it turned out, however, only three districts—the DalVO [Far East Military District], SKVO [North Caucasus Military District] and LenVO [Leningrad Military District]—responded to the instructions from the commander in chief of the Ground Troops, at least sending lists of those who were to arrive as replacements. The other districts did not even bother to do this.

"We call the Personnel Training and Placement Directorate just about every day regarding the rotation," Col B. Malykhin, deputy chief of the personnel department of the GRVZ, explained. "We sent a telegram there during the first part of August, stating that the rotation has practically come to a halt. Officers do not want to go to the Transcaucasus."

It cannot be said, however, that officers have not been arriving in the GRVZ. They have... upon graduating from military schools. Lt A. Arakelyan and two of his

classmates from the Novosibirsk VOKU [Combined-Arms Higher Command School] (three out of the entire graduating class!) were assigned to the GRVZ because they were Armenians. Lt Sergey Ruchko, signalman, says that he was assigned there "because the command element does not like me." With respect to officers with some length of service and experience, they are willing even to be discharged into the reserve, anything to avoid serving in the Transcaucasus.

"I constantly receive calls from colleagues in the districts," says Maj V. Zheludkov, chief of the personnel selection and placement section. "Mainly with requests to cancel the rotation of this or that officer. But how can we do that? I hold out...."

Telegrams such as the following are also sent: We are sorry, but we cannot place Col Ye. Chudinov, senior officer in the operations directorate, in a position in this category in the LenVO. There is a vacant position for a lieutenant colonel.

"What have we done to deserve this?" Maj Zheludkov asks with indignation. "Are we supposed to send a good officer to a position with a lower rank? And why should we send one to fill a vacant position? The directive plainly states: 'Officers are to be assigned to positions in their specific field. In the absence of such, with the agreement of the personnel department of the GRVZ, they may be assigned from related or primary positions in the same specialties. The most stringent steps—even to the point of discharging them—are to be taken in the case of officers selected as replacements in the GRVZ who do not want to go there but do not have a valid excuse.'"

How is the absence of rotation affecting the morale and the mental state of the officers?

"Badly," was how Col B. Shcherbinin, chief of the medical service at the Tbilisi Garrison, answered the question. "Especially their health. Unfortunately, we lack the data for studying the growth trend for this or that illness. We will have them following the fall clinical examination of the officers. I can predict an increase in gastrointestinal illnesses. As many as 60 percent of the officers live without their families, after all, and eat mostly canned foods. There will possibly be an increase in disorders of the nervous system and hypertonic sickness."

This is the information I was given at the GRVZ headquarters.

Consumption of alcohol on the job increased considerably at garrisons in the group of forces during the first 7 months of this year. It almost doubled at the Akhalkalaki Garrison, for example. Crimes by officers have been recorded there. Gross infractions of discipline have remained practically at the same level. The picture is the same at other garrisons.

Incidentally, 206 officers were discharged from the GRVZ during the first 4 months of 1993, and 150 submitted requests for discharge.

There is no future, and the service has no attraction.

Sailors Assigned Police Duties

93UM0843A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 93 p 2

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Shirokov: "The Army Enters the Battle Against Crime"]

[Text] A large-scale operation against crime, code-named "Signal," is presently in full swing in Vladivostok, capital of the Maritime region.

Additional police and military personnel from Pacific Fleet units have been enlisted to conduct the operation. A similar operation was previously conducted in Nakhodka and Ussuriysk.

CIS: POLICY

Signals Directorate Reorganized

93UM0851B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Boris Borisov: "Main Military Directorate of the Communications Ministry of the Russian Federation Reorganized"]

[Text] By order of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation dated September 9 of this year, the Communications Ministry of Russia was told to reorganize the Main Military Repair and Restoration Directorate of the Communications Ministry of the Russian Federation and military formations subordinate to it by December 31, 1999.

The reorganization of the restoration military formations should be carried out before December 31, 1997.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Commander-in-Chief Deynekin Comments on Goals, Missions of Reorganization

93UM0863A Moscow KRASNYY VOIN in Russian 7 Aug 93 p 3

[Article by Col-Gen Avn Petr Deynekin, commander in chief of the Air Forces, under the rubric "Russia's Air Forces": "Always Prepared for Action"]

[Text] Col-Gen Avn Petr Deynekin, commander in chief of the Air Forces, was born on 14 December 1937 in the city of Morozovsk, Rostov Oblast. He graduated from the Balashov Military Air School for Pilots in 1957. He began his career in the service as a copilot.

Upon graduating from the Military Air Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin in 1969, he was appointed deputy commander of a squadron and then commander of an air squadron of a Guards bomber regiment. He became deputy commander of an air regiment in 1971; commander, in 1973. He assumed command of a long-range air division in 1977.

Upon graduating from the General Staff Military Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1982, he served as deputy commander for combat training of an air army. In 1985 he was appointed commander of an air army. In 1988 he assumed command of the long-range aviation. In 1990 he was appointed deputy commander, in 1991 commander, of the Air Forces.

He was appointed commander in chief of Russia's Air Forces in 1992.

Russia's Air Forces are experiencing a difficult period of organizational development, reformation, reduction and the withdrawal of large air groupings from abroad. It would be perfectly natural for the readers to ask: When a number of the largest aviation enterprises, dozens of airfields and highly important specialist training centers were left outside of Russia following the collapse of the USSR and can no longer be counted on, and when there is an acute shortage of financing, fuel and housing, will the Russian Federation not ultimately be grounded, and will the military airmen be capable of performing the missions facing them? But let us not be in a hurry to take away our status as an air power. If we look at the situation from a professional standpoint, we can see that reforms are underway, albeit slowly and with incredible difficulties. There are grounds for rational optimism.

By Reducing Quantity, We Are Gaining Quality

The time for action in conducting the military reform and organizational development came in May of last year, when the decision was adopted to form the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. By that time other sovereign states had succeeded in assuming jurisdiction over a fairly large part of the former Union's air forces. When the USSR's legacy was divided up, Russia received 85 percent of the aviation industry's enterprises, 14,000 pilots and 5,000 aircraft. The Air Forces' arsenal included several dozen types of aircraft for various purposes. In keeping with the principle of rational adequacy, several types—only the modern ones—would be the optimal situation.

All the more since this possibility exists. During the past 5-7 years we have received new aircraft systems not inferior to their Western counterparts and even superior to the latter in some respects. Furthermore, despite the shortage of allocations for developing the VVS [Air Forces]—more about that later—projects are ongoing to replace the pool of SUs, TUs and MIGs, and more than 100 investment programs have been worked out.

The design and production of new aviation equipment have always been at the focus of the Air Force command element's attention. In order to adapt the weapons programs to the new economic situation, it was necessary to revise the system of weapons orders and purchases, to precisely define the functions of military agents at defense enterprises and to abandon the creation and production of a number of models of military equipment. The military equipment policy has been reoriented toward the creation of highly efficient, economical and competitive models of aviation equipment and weapons, and the optimal complexing of weapons systems, including the coordinated development of systems and means of command and control and support systems. From now on we will be accepting only completely finished aviation equipment which has successfully undergone both state and military testing. The praxis of bringing new models up to the prescribed standards after they are in operation has been ended.

This is precisely why, while abandoning the obsolete, third generation of SU-7 and SU-17, MIG-21, MIG-23 and MIG-27, and TU-16 and TU-22 aircraft, we are leaving the air regiments with the new, fourth generation of aircraft with two or more engines such as the TU-22m, IL-76 and IL-78, the TU-95ms, the MIG-29 light fighter for close combat and the SU-27 for long-range action. The SU-25 ground-attack plane and helicopters will be the main air weapons on the battlefield. The pool of front bombers consists of several hundred SU-24s. The long-range aviation has a quantity of TU-95ms and TU-160 aircraft set by international agreements, with high-precision cruise missiles. The military transport aviation is equipped with several hundred IL-76 and ANT-124 Ruslan aircraft.

The reader should not be disturbed by the quantitative reduction of the aircraft pool. For one thing, because, while cutting the quantity, we are gaining quality. In the second place, we are simultaneously taking specific steps to see that efficient use is made of existing personnel and equipment for creating battleworthy air groupings. For example, it is planned to develop air formations out of certain military air schools and training centers. Furthermore, regiments flying combat aircraft are being removed from training centers—without being redeployed, which is particularly important—and placed on line in the formations.

The Objectives and Missions of the Organizational Development of the Air Forces

With respect to the missions of the Air Forces in the contemporary situation, I would point out that they have become more complex and diversified. At the present time the Air Forces are one of determining factors behind restraint and elimination of an entire class of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. The Air Forces continue to be the main means of operational-strategic mobility for the armed forces. In peace time they are a very important component of

the latter, with a high state of readiness for immediate action on any possible axis of aggression, and in time of war they are the main means of inflicting strikes upon an enemy with high-precision weapons to the entire depth of his operational disposition and of providing the groupings of forces with great mobility.

The main objective of the organizational development of the Air Forces for the period extending to the year 2000 has been defined as one of creating out of the Russian Federation's existing air formations a separate, highly mobile branch of the armed forces with a balance of personnel, modern aviation equipment and weapons, capable of performing the entire group of missions assigned to it in joint or separate operations and with minimal maintenance costs. The successful accomplishment of this objective is directly dependent upon the course of the reform, and specifically upon the withdrawal of troops during the period 1993-1995 and the establishment of air groupings on Russian territory, the reduction of the Air Forces to the specified numerical strength, the completion of the formation of all agencies of command and control, the transition to a mixed manning system and alteration of the personnel training system.

Due to the change in views on the employment of the armed forces and the reduction of defense allocations, we can no longer—and there is no need to—maintain the enormous number of aircraft which we had until December 1985. Furthermore, for a number of reasons part of which have been mentioned, we clearly have an excess of flight personnel (2-3 airmen per cockpit, instead of the civilized standard of 15 men for every 10 aircraft).

It was a matter of how to conserve assets and retain pilots without undermining the combat readiness of the groupings. We took the following route. Since there is no need to train the former number of pilots, we will not maintain so many air schools. By 1995, in the course of converting to the new structure, there will be a significant reduction: Two Air Force schools will be eliminated, cadet enrollment will be reduced by half, and 494 small units within Russia and 124 outside the country will be disbanded. At the same time the training air regiments have a highly skilled staff and good physical facilities. By replacing their trainers with combat aircraft, we shall give new quality to the air grouping at minimal cost.

While we have no problems when it comes to flight personnel and their training, the situation is far more difficult with respect to technical specialists and first-term servicemen. For well-known reasons, for example, fewer than 50 percent of the authorized, necessary number of soldiers were recruited. We are solving the problem by recruiting those willing to serve under contract. And not just men; women too. Proposals have been worked out for replacing 20,000 positions for enlisted men with blue- and white-collar workers. In addition, 22,000 positions in the Air

Forces can be filled by female military personnel even now. This has been 97 percent completed in the long-range aviation, for example. The figure is only one third in other formations in which only a weak effort is being made to accomplish this.

One other thing: The new structure for the Air Forces will enable us considerably to reduce the number and size of administrative structures. Among other things, the command elements of the air forces in the military districts will be reduced by 15-20 percent.

How Can the Problems Be Resolved?

The organizational development of the Air Forces is being carried out in a situation of economic and sociopolitical reforms, an acute shortage of financial and material resources, infringements upon the integrity of the military aviation's infrastructure and a certain drop in authority for the armed forces and loss of prestige for the service.

Personally, I feel an acute sense of guilt before the airmen, who are unable to fly as much as needed for their training. It is our dream to have scientifically based and, most important, attainable standards. Without this neither professionalism nor a solution to the flight safety problem can be achieved. Once again, everything is due to a shortage of materiel (aircraft fuel, oil, spare parts, engines) and to the fact that we are having to create practically anew a system of logistic support for the combat training.

There is an acute shortage also of budgeted allocations for development of the Air Forces. Specifically, there is no stable financing for the purchase of fuel for the Ministry of Defense. Once again, only 76 percent of the calculated norm has been allocated for 1993. We can only hope that through the joint efforts of Russia's government and the Ministry of Defense's industry a way out of the situation will still be found. Especially since appropriate decisions have been adopted, including one on allocations for the fuel and energy industry.

I am thoroughly convinced that we have not totally exhausted all of our internal reserves. Take just the one problem area, the state of the military aviation industry and science, the financing of these branches and prospects for their development. The situation is extremely alarming here as well. We face a disastrous shortage of money, the problem of retaining workers and scientists, and a reduction in the number of tests of aviation equipment from year to year. But we can not simply throw up our hands, can we? All the more since experience has shown that there are people prepared to go to work on the problems. Among other things, the solution lies in defining for the Air Forces a list of defense enterprises, including aviation plants and OKB [special design offices], which should be given the

status of state defense enterprises, with a corresponding system of financial guarantees and tax benefits. Another promising approach lies in creating dual-use aviation equipment, using extrabudgetary funds from Russian and foreign investors and uniting the efforts of all of the ministries and departments involved for the development and joint utilization of Russia's entire airfield system. And a great deal has already been done toward this.

Air Force Recruiting Advertisement

93U M08454 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Aug 93 p.3

[Air Force Recruiting Advertisement: "The Air Force Has Very Simple Advertising: It Advertises Itself. All You Have to Do Is Choose"]

[Text] "I switch on the afterburner. The fighter pushes away from the ground and streaks through the sky. I'm flying! My heart is filled with joy and the triumph of victory."—Viktor Kamyshev, cadet.

"I have looked at the skies with envy since I was a child. I wanted to conquer the skies in flying machines. I still dream of this today, when I'm already 21 years old and have a wife and child."—Andrey Prikhovzhev, tank mechanic and driver.

"To me, a military pilot is the standard of a man."—Tatyana Koltsova, businesswoman.

Happiness is becoming one with the skies, devoting a long life to them, going off into the cloudy heights, as master of an awesome, steel bird.

The altitudes never cease, if you live and breathe them; flights never end, if you have a soaring soul.—Marina Popovich.

The most prestigious, romantic, and popular profession, not only in Russia but also throughout the world, no doubt, is the profession of aviator. The Fatherland's best minds, its bravest and boldest have sought to overcome the earth's gravity, to master the secrets of the fifth ocean, to discover what no one has seen before.

Aviation was pioneered by the outstanding scientists A. Mozhayskiy and N. Zhukovskiy. Pilots S. Utochkin, P. Nesterov, and A. Artseulov won glory for our Motherland through their hard work, courage, and bravery. V. Chkalov, M. Gromov, V. Kokkinaki, and G. Baydukov boldly went forth into the unknown, setting records for range, altitude, and speed. Pilots were the first Heroes of the Soviet Union. And during the Great Patriotic War, the Gold Stars of Heroes were conferred on more than 2,400 people; this title was conferred on 65 of them twice, and on two—I. Kozhedub and A. Pokryshkin—three times.

You should know that if you are brave, persistent, and hard-working, a challenging course of study will put you in the cockpit of a super-sophisticated fighter or

bomber, helicopter, or airship (and, if you're lucky, in a spacecraft—every Russian spacecraft commander has been an Air Force officer).

THE AIR FORCE IS

- The most mobile and versatile arm of the Russian Armed Forces. In a matter of hours, aviation groups can be dispatched hundreds and thousands of kilometers away from their permanent deployment sites. By becoming an Air Force officer, you can conquer any distance, altitude, or speed.
- The most sophisticated MIG-29 and Su-27 fighters and the SU-24 M bomber can be refueled in the air. These are highly complex aviation systems that incorporate the latest advances and make extensive use of computerized systems. By becoming an Air Force serviceman, you will become the master of this technology.
- The superclass long-range missile-armed Tu-160 and the Tu-95 MS strategic bombers. By mastering these airplanes, you will be able to travel thousands of kilometers in a single flight, make intercontinental flights, and conquer time and space.
- The Ruslan, Antey, and Il-76MD airplanes. Flying these airplanes, you will be able to transport an assault force, equipment, and commercial cargo over great distances. Military-transport aviation pilots have been in virtually every country of the world.

In the challenging and glorious task of conquering the fifth ocean, you can brilliantly demonstrate your talent, bravery, and willpower. Those who enter the field of aviation are captivated by it for the rest of their lives. What could be more enviable than such a fate?

For a young person who is deciding what to do with his life, the Air Force offers the most alluring, unusual, brilliant, interesting, and promising prospects.

YOU HAVEN'T MADE UP YOUR MIND YET? YOU STILL HAVE DOUBTS? THEN YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT IN THE AIR FORCE, YOU WILL BE ABLE TO:

- provide for your own material welfare and that of your family. A pilot, navigator, or deputy aircraft commander with the rank of Senior Lieutenant (as of July) earns:
 - 22,000 rubles in rank pay;
 - 35,000 rubles in specialty pay;
 - bonuses: 5,700 rubles for long-time service; 10,500 rubles for special working conditions; 2,800 rubles for becoming a specialist first class; 5,250 rubles for serving in remote areas; and 3,500 rubles for serving in remote territories. That adds up to more than 80,000 rubles a month.

And an officer earns all that just one year after graduating from military school. And that amount increases every year as he adds more years of service, is promoted to higher ranks and posts, and, of course, as inflation rises.

But that's not all. Every year you'll receive a one-time cash bonus for conscientious service. Pilots, navigators, and deputy aircraft commanders receive 171,000 rubles. Plus another 57,000 rubles (for leave, as a rule).

But that's not all. It's not easy for a young family to set up a household these days. You can do that by taking out an interest-free (!) loan of up to 12 times your salary three months after being assigned to a military post on finishing school and being promoted to the first officer rank of lieutenant. (A pilot can borrow 660,000 rubles, and a technician 600,000 rubles.)

You haven't made up your mind yet? Well, that's not all. Only in the Air Force, in addition to the standard set of military uniforms, you will receive either 260,000 rubles' worth of flight gear or 120,000 rubles' worth of technical gear.

In the Air Force, one month of flight service counts as one and one-half to two months. This period of service is used as the basis for paying a percentage-based bonus for overall length of service and in calculating your pension.

Only in the Air Force will you be fed in an airmen's or maintenance technicians' cafeteria (free of charge).

There are a good many other benefits for both Russian Army servicemen in general and aviators in particular.

IF YOU HAVE FINALLY MADE UP YOUR MIND, CHOOSE ANY MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION THAT SUITS YOU:

- The Professor N. Zhukovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy (125167 Moscow-167, 40 Leningrad Prospekt). Here you will become a engineer-researcher in one of the following specialties: aircraft, aircraft armament, aircraft equipment, computerized guidance systems, or aircraft electronics.
- The Balashov Higher Military Aviation School (412340 Balashov-3, Saratov Oblast).
- The Barnaul Higher Military Aviation Pilot School (656018 Barnaul-18).
- The Kachinskoye Higher Military Aviation Pilot School (400010 Volgograd-10).
- The Tambov Higher Military Aviation Pilot School (392004 Tambov-4).
- The Chelyabinsk Higher Military Aviation Navigator School (454015 Chelyabinsk-15).

We can tell you right now that at the Balashov school you'll study to become a military transport aviation pilot; at the Barnaul school, a fighter-bomber pilot; at the Kachinskoye school, a fighter pilot; at the Tambov school, a long-range bomber pilot; and at the Chelyabinsk school, a navigator who will be able to fly in any of the aviation arms or branches.

If it turns out that, for health or other reasons, you are not admitted to a flying school, but you still can't live without aviation, don't despair. The Air Force can always offer you an occupation you'll like, people here

will always help you. You will belong to the glorious cohort of aviators if you choose one of the following schools:

- The Irkutsk Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (664036 Irkutsk-36).
- The Yeysk Higher Military Aviation School (353660 Yeysk-7, Krasnodar Kray).
- The Voronezh Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (393064 Voronezh-64).
- The Tambov Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (392006 Tambov-6).

On graduating from these schools, you will become an engineer in one of the following specialties: aircraft and power systems, aircraft armament, aviation equipment, aviation electronics. At the Yeysk school, you can become an air traffic control officer, and at the Voronezh school you can obtain a specialty in airfield logistical support, building power systems, aviation rear services, automotive equipment, or meteorology.

Or you can choose any secondary school:

- The Achinsk Military Aviation Technical School (662100 Achinsk-1, Krasnodar Kray).
- The Kirov Military Aviation Technical School (610041 Kirov-41).
- The Krasnodar Military Combined Flight and Technical School (350005 Krasnodar-5).
- The Kurgan Military Aviation Technical School (610016 Kurgan-16).
- The Perm Military Aviation Technical School (614040 Perm-49).

You will leave the halls of these schools as a lieutenant with a specialty in airplane (helicopter) equipment and engines, aircraft armament, aviation equipment or aviation electronics.

If you still have some questions, contact a military registration office, and if you're already in the service, see your unit commanding officers. They will help you choose exactly what you need. Don't miss your chance!

The Air Force consists almost entirely of professionals. If you decide to serve under contract, the Air Force will find a job that suits you. As a soldier, sergeant, or senior sergeant, you will earn:

- a monthly pay of 32,500 to 40,000 rubles;
- a free uniform and sundries allowance;
- a free monthly food ration;
- depending on length of service, a 30- to 45-day annual leave with free passage to wherever you plan to spend it and back;
- an annual cash bonus of at least three months' pay for conscientious service. And all the many other benefits that Russian servicemen have.

ARE YOU CONVINCED THAT SERVING IN THE AIR FORCE IS PROMISING AND APPEALING? REAL MEN CHOOSE ONLY THE AIR FORCE! YOU DO THE SAME!

Performance, Specifications of 'Universal-1E' Air Defense Radar

93UM08594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Valentin Rudenko, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "The 'Universal-1E' Serves in the PVO Troops"]

[Text] It is impossible to ensure reliable air defense without automated command and control systems under contemporary conditions. The "Universal-1E" command post provides automation in a PVO [Air Defense] tactical formation that includes surface-to-air missile brigades, fighter aviation regiments, radiotechnical brigades and their command and control elements. It was developed at "Proton" Scientific-Production Association [NPO] under the overall management of General Designer Professor Aleksandr Gribov, Chief Designer Professor Sergey Volodin directly managed work on the development of the command post.

Primary Specifications of the "Universal-1E" Command Post

Number of targets being processed simultaneously	300
Number of command and controlled and coordinating units	16
Time to bring the system to combat readiness, minutes	5
Maximums for work against targets	
Range, km	3,200
Altitude, km	100
Speed, km per hour	4,400
Number of automated workstations	15

As of today, the "Universal-1E" is the most powerful tactical level PVO command post. It is capable of assuming command and control of up to 12 surface-to-air missile unit command posts, up to four aviation unit command posts, up to seven aircraft vectoring post command posts, up to three electronic warfare unit command posts, up to three radar unit command posts, and up to 10 Su-27 and MIG-31 fighter aircraft group command posts, thereby providing a total defense system for a territory 1,200 kilometers along the front and the same in the depth. The calculation of the ratio of the forces participating in an air raid and the development of recommendations required to make decisions is conducted in real-time at all levels.

The "Universal-1E" has been manufactured based upon a modern component and design-technological base using the latest achievements in the sphere of the algorithmization of combat command and control processes.

—“Such algorithms have been realized in the command post that permit the generals and officers sitting at the displays to simply observe the development of events,” said “Proton” NPO Deputy General Director for Scientific Work Professor Yakov Bezel. “We have not called it a totally automated command post only because we thought it necessary to leave to a human the right to make the final decision in especially critical and conflict situations. Say, when problems arise with the determination of the nationality of an airborne target. For example, that could occur if the IFF [Identification Friend or Foe] device is not operating or when the aircraft-violator is flying within range of an aircraft that is responding to the query.”

Based upon expert assessments, “Universal-IE” has no precise duplicates in the world. All methods of multi-level processing of radar and other information have been rationally utilized in our command post.

Prolonged, uninterrupted operation with maintenance of comfortable conditions for servicing personnel is possible thanks to high reliability and resistance to external influences and the availability of independent power supply and life support systems under any operating conditions and practically in all areas of the world.

Structurally, the “Universal-IE” Automated Command Post can be made in mobile or fixed variants. In the mobile variant, it is composed of several shelters (combat command and control, fighter aviation combat command and control, diagnostics and information recording, communications and data transmission, a communications equipment suite, and an independent energy supply system) that are mounted on semitrailers. These semitrailers can be transported both independently—using prime movers and also by air, rail, or water transport. But if you consider that one command post is sufficient to cover an enormous territory, in practice the need to deploy it is improbable.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

V-Adm Kaisin: Missions, Problems of New Navy
93UM0854A Moscow MILITARY NEWS BULLETIN
in English No 7 (19), Jul 93 pp 2-1—2-3

[Article by Vice-Admiral Yuri Kaisin, deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Navy: “Russian Navy—The Navy of a Great Power”]

[Text] The Russian Armed Forces are experiencing a difficult period of their revival today. Part of this process involves the making of the Russian Navy, and new views on its role and place, approaches to its construction and so on are being developed.

In the new circumstances the potential use of the Russian navy is based on two concepts: In peacetime—containment and naval cooperation; in case of aggression against Russia and its allies—timely defence and the curbing of aggression. The essence of these concepts lies in the maintenance of a navy which strikingly and convincingly demonstrates to any potential aggressor that an attack on our country and its allies will entail unacceptable losses.

The navy’s leadership regards the maintenance of the fighting efficiency of the naval strategic nuclear force as a priority objective. Even in the conditions of sharp budget restrictions, everything is being done to fully satisfy its requirements.

Our missile carrying submarines are on operational duty both in the sea and at bases. During the past three years, due to substantial changes in the international situation and the reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation, we have almost halved the number of submarines on sea patrols. In our view, there is no need to keep more than half the battle-ready missile-carrying submarines at sea and in the state of highest readiness for the launching of missiles, as do the USA, Britain and France. We shall carry on the existing practice when a smaller part of the missile carriers will be on operational duty in the sea and the other part in bases in sufficiently high combat readiness.

In accordance with the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START-2), signed on January 3, 1993, the share of Russia’s naval strategic nuclear force—NSNF—in the overall amount of nuclear forces of the country will increase from 27.3 percent to more than 50 percent. This entails a significant increase in the role and responsibility of the navy for the security of Russia and in expenditure on the maintenance of the fighting efficiency of the Navy and the development and improvement of strategic missile submarine complexes (SMSC’s) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM’s).

In the conditions of the Start-2 Treaty, with the quantitative levels of combat charges that go with the SLBM’s are roughly equal, the quality of the components of the NSNF (SMSC’s and SLBM’s) and their potential capability are beginning to assume particular importance. Unfortunately, in these parameters Russian missile carrying submarines and SLBM’s already yield considerably to the American ones, because both the ships and missiles of the Russian NSNF became operational five to ten years earlier than their American counterparts. In addition, the bilateral Start-2 Treaty does not take account of the British and French naval strategic nuclear forces, which will already by the beginning of 1996 possess two-thirds of the amount of warheads of the SLBM’s which the Start-2 Treaty envisages for Russia and the USA.

The improvement and development of the other types of forces of the Russian navy is carried out to enhance their combat qualities and impart the properties of a multipurpose, universal force to them. The chief objective—to create a smaller, but more up-to-date and combat-efficient navy—can only be achieved in this way.

In accordance with the declared reduction of the numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Navy's personnel numbers will be reduced by 25-30 percent over the next two to three years, along with a substantial simplification of the organisational structure of the fleets via the elimination of superfluous control agencies. The forward groups of forces which formerly operated on a permanent basis in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean ceased last year to function and the headquarters of these squadrons have been disbanded. However, our ships will continue to operate periodically in different oceanic and sea areas, participating if necessary in UN peacemaking operations.

A draft ten-year programme of military shipbuilding for the Russian navy has currently been prepared, which takes all these specific features into account. The government has determined the priorities in shipbuilding and, despite the fact that our programme is somewhat reduced, the process of replacement of obsolete ships with new ones will continue, although, undoubtedly, not at a previous pace and not on an earlier scale.

The navy today still has many serious problems requiring their solution.

Above all, these concern the withdrawal from the navy of obsolete nuclear-powered submarines, their numbers approach 100. In our country they are normally withdrawn upon reaching the prescribed term of service (25 years). But these periods have now been cut, owing to the fulfilment by the Russian side of its obligations involving the reduction of strategic naval forces and the exclusion from the navy of ships of obsolete design: restoration of their performance characteristics is economically inexpedient.

At nuclear-powered submarines excluded from the navy, safety measures, including nuclear ones, are being implemented. Therefore, in the main power plant, conditions are being created whereby it becomes impossible to transfer it from a regime of storage into operational mode. Control over the plant under storage is organised to ensure its safety until the discharging of the reactor's active zone. Work on discharging is carried out by specially trained personnel, employing special technical means and observing nuclear and radiation safety measures. After the discharging of the active zones, the reactors of nuclear-powered submarines are not a source of nuclear danger.

In 1992 the Russian Government adopted a comprehensive programme to use nuclear-powered submarines, but its implementation has been held up by a shortage of financial resources, although everything dependent on the navy is being carried out unconditionally despite existing difficulties.

Another, equally important problem concerns ship repairs, that is the maintenance of the navy's technical readiness. Following the break-up of the USSR and the emergence of independent states, a number of enterprises used for these purposes by the navy are now located in Ukraine, Azerbaijan and the Baltic countries. Some of them (in Ukraine and the Baltic) were planned in 1993 for use to repair naval ships, but as yet there are no treaties or agreements regulating this work. The agreement signed in January between the heads of government of Russia and Ukraine on cooperation in shipbuilding and ship repairs requires further detailisation.

One more problem, which has received frequent coverage in the mass media of late, is the Black Sea Fleet and the completion in Ukraine of ships which remain in its yards, in particular the aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag. Intergovernmental negotiations are continuing at present on the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine: the discussion focuses on the status of the fleet during the transitional period, and the establishment of a Russian Black Sea Fleet and the naval forces of Ukraine on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR, which is currently under the direct command of the presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Naturally, the formation of the fleets cannot be regarded in isolation from the system of their deployment and logistics supply. As more than 95 percent of the coastal structure of the Black Sea Fleet is located on the territory of the Crimea and Ukraine, given a fair approach to the solution of this question, some part of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia must be located on its existing bases, including Sevastopol. But this problem can be solved during interstate negotiations.

We also envisage the location of the forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the Russian Black Sea coast. But the establishment of new location bases for the ships, aircraft and coastal forces of the fleet, and a control and logistics system is a long and expensive process.

One should note in passing, as regards the problem of completion of the ships, including the Varyag, that the navy's leadership recognises the need to build and incorporate large aircraft carriers in the navy. To solve defensive tasks and ensure the combat stability of the naval forces, the concept of the development of the navy provides for the availability to the navy of heavy-duty aircraft-carrying cruisers equipped with fighter planes and helicopters. The Minister of Defence

of the Russian Federation stressed in a televised interview the urgent need for Russia to have such ships.

In this context, the completion of the heavy-duty aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag for the Russian Federation is one of the key elements of a balanced naval development programme. Significant material and financial resources have already been spent on its construction. The halt in the building of this ship has caused new problems for Russia and Ukraine. In these circumstances, it appears to be preferable to complete the construction of the Varyag cruiser not so much from a military as from an economic point of view.

We are seeking to draft the best solution to this question, with due regard for the interests of both sides. Negotiations and consultations are currently under way on a whole range of issues related to the completion of the Varyag cruiser. The fate of this ship will finally be determined by Russia and Ukraine at governmental level.

Finally, I shall dwell on one more problem: conscription and enlistment.

In connection with the shortage of call-up resources, a really difficult situation has developed now with the recruitment of sailors and starshinas for the navy's ships and units. And this, naturally, affects the level of combat readiness and engenders overloads for existing personnel. It is a serious problem for the Navy and all the Armed Forces of Russia. We plan to reduce the manpower gap by cutting down on authorised manning levels and admitting citizens to military service on a contract basis.

In conclusion I must say that by implementing the plans and solving these problems, we will create for Russia a navy worthy of its name: the navy of a great power.

Our reference: Yuri Anatolyevich Kaisin was born on May 10, 1940, in the town of Luga in the Leningrad region. He graduated from the Pacific S. O. Makarov Higher Naval School, the Naval Academy and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Kaisin rose through all the stages of ship service to the commander of a SSBN submarine. He held the positions of deputy unit commander, chief of staff of a formation, deputy chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, and deputy directorate chief of the Main Staff of the Navy.

Since 1991 he has been Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy - Directorate Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy.

Biographical Notes on Senior Commanders

93UM0853A Moscow MILITARY NEWS BULLETIN
in English No 7 (19), Jul 93 pp 1-3—1-4

[Text]

Admiral Valentin Ye. Selivanov, Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy—First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy

Born on March 17, 1936, in the village of Stanovaya, Lipetsk Region. After finishing the M. V. Frunze Higher Naval School in 1958, was appointed commander of an air-defence battery of a destroyer of the Pacific Fleet, and later climbed from commander of a mine-artillery combat unit to assistant commander of a small anti-submarine ship, to commander of a small anti-submarine ship.

In 1965 he graduated from the Higher Specialised Officers' Classes of the Navy and commanded a patrol ship and a destroyer of the Pacific Fleet.

After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1971, he was appointed chief - deputy commander of a brigade of anti-submarine ships of the Baltic Fleet. Later he commanded a brigade of destroyers and a division of missile ships.

In 1978 he became chief of staff - deputy commander, and later commander of a squadron of the Navy. In 1985-92 he was chief of staff - first deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, commander of the Leningrad naval base - commandant of the Kronstadt naval fortress.

In September 1992 he was appointed Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

Admiral Igor V. Kasatonov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy

Born on February 10, 1939 in Vladivostok. After finishing the Black Sea P. S. Nakhimov Higher Naval School in 1960, he commanded a battery of a destroyer's department of the Black Sea and Pacific fleets, and a missile ship's department of the Black Sea Fleet.

In 1967 he graduated from the Higher Specialised Officers' Classes of the Navy and was appointed an executive officer and then commander of a large anti-submarine ship of the Black Sea Fleet.

After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1972, he was appointed commander of a large anti-submarine ship. In 1975 he became chief of staff - deputy commander of a division of anti-submarine ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1979 and until 1992 he served as chief of staff - deputy

commander of a division of anti-submarine ships, commander of a division of anti-submarine ships of the Black Sea Fleet, commander of the Kola Flotilla of the Northern Fleet, first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet, and commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

In September 1992 he became First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

**Vice-Admiral Vasily P. Yeremin, Deputy
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy**

Born on January 2, 1943 in the village of Nashchekino, Tambov Region. After finishing the Higher Naval School in 1967 he commanded a battery of the artillery department of a Black Sea Fleet destroyer, and commander of the mine-torpedo department of a large anti-submarine ship.

After graduating from the Higher Specialised Officers' Classes of the Navy in 1972, he held the posts of assistant commander of a training cruiser, executive officer of a large anti-submarine ship, and commander of a large anti-submarine ship.

In 1979 he graduated from the Naval Academy and was appointed chief of staff - deputy commander of a task brigade of missile ships of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1983-87 he was commander of a task brigade of missile ships and commander of a division of anti-submarine ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1989, he was appointed commander of a task squadron of the Northern Fleet, and in 1991, first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet.

In September 1992 he became Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

**Vice-Admiral Alexandr V. Gorbunov, Deputy
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - Chief of the Combat
Training Directorate of the Navy**

Born on October 4, 1940 in Dzerzhinsk, Gorky Region. After finishing the Pacific S. O. Makarov Higher Naval School in 1963, he was commander of a submarine torpedo group, commander of a submarine mine-torpedo department, and executive officer of a submarine of the Pacific Fleet.

In 1970 he graduated from the Higher Specialised Officers' Classes of the Navy and was appointed executive officer of a cruiser submarine of the Pacific and Northern fleets.

In 1974-92 he served as commander of an ocean-going submarine of the Northern Fleet, deputy commander of a submarine division, deputy commander of a task squadron, commander of a submarine division of the Northern Fleet, first deputy commander and commander of a flotilla, commander of a task squadron of

the Black Sea Fleet, and first deputy chief in charge of combat training in the Navy.

In 1982 he graduated from the Naval Academy by correspondence.

In September 1992 he was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - Chief of the Combat Training Directorate of the Navy.

**Colonel-General Viktor P. Potapov, Commander of
Naval Aviation**

Born on January 7, 1934 in the village of Muratovka, Penza Region. After finishing the Naval Torpedo Aviation School in 1953, he served as a senior pilot, flight commander, ship aviation, and a unit of an aviation regiment of the Black Sea Fleet's aviation.

In 1962 he graduated from the Naval Academy of held the posts of detachment commander, deputy squadron commander, squadron commander, deputy commander of an aviation regiment of the Black Sea and Northern fleets. In 1967 he was appointed commander of a detached anti-submarine long-range aviation regiment of the Northern Fleet's aviation, and in 1971, commander of a naval missile-carrying aviation division of the Northern Fleet's aviation. In 1974 he became deputy commander of the Northern Fleet's aviation.

After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1980, he was appointed commander of naval aviation - deputy commander of the Northern Fleet for aviation. In 1986-90 he was first deputy commander of naval aviation and then commander of naval aviation. In 1990 he was appointed aviation chief - deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy for aviation.

In September 1992 he became Commander of Naval Aviation.

**Lieutenant-General Ivan S. Skuratov, Commander of the
Coastal Forces of the Navy**

Born on June 2, 1940 in the village of Bolshe-Popovo, Lipetsk Region. After finishing the Black Sea P. S. Nakhimov Higher Naval School in 1964, he held the posts of chief of a battery section of a detached coastal missile regiment of the Black Sea and Pacific fleets, commander of a technical battery of a coastal missile division, deputy commander and then commander of a coastal missile division of the Pacific Fleet.

In 1974 he graduated from the Naval Academy and was appointed commander of a detached mobile coastal missile regiment of the Baltic Fleet, and later became chief specialist of the combat-training missile units of the Navy, and chief of the coastal missile-artillery forces and marines of the Baltic Fleet.

After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in

1987, he served as chief specialist of the missile units and marines of the Navy and chief of the coastal forces of the Navy.

In September 1992 he was appointed Commander of the Coastal Forces of the Navy.

Candidate of military science.

Supreme Soviet Investigates Finances of Northern Fleet

93UM08574 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "Northern Fleet in a Financial Blockade. Will They Help It to Resist?"]

[Text] At the beginning of September, a parliamentary commission that included not only deputies but also representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Finances, and the Ministry of Economics was working at the Northern Fleet. Last Friday at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, the head of the commission, chief of the department for questions of social and economic development of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and People's Deputy of Russia Boris Isayev, proposed also including the situation that has developed in the Northern Fleet in the work agenda of the session. Today, 17 September, the deputies intend to discuss the problems of the members of the Northern Fleet. And it must be noted that these problems are numerous.

In a conversation with me, Boris Mikhaylovich stressed the main thing: the financing of the fleet has practically been suspended. Hence all the problems—it is impossible to carry out planned repair work (only one-third of such work is being performed with respect to warships and 3.8 percent in relation to auxiliary ships) and there is nothing with which to pay for deliveries of fuel and lubricants, materials and equipment, clothing, and other things. The fleet lacks elementary items. An example is electric light bulbs—on ships they are worth their weight in gold. They have even stopped providing sailors' shirts for the seamen. Today it is much easier to find them in second-hand markets in Moscow.

The main problem in the fleet is the payment of regular wages, leave, and allowances. Boris Isayev told of cases in which crews of nuclear submarines turn to commercial structures for loans before going out on alert duty. They have to leave some money for the needs of their families. Of course the businessmen help out the sailors, but they do not forget about interest.

If any of the readers has not realized what we are talking about here, I will remind him: It is about the most up-to-date and powerful Russian fleet—the Red Banner Northern Fleet—a nuclear missile fleet, the shield and sword of the fatherland.

In the last two years, by the way, this "shield and sword" has received only two new ships. On the other hand, it got very much into debt, just like some kind of limited partnership that miscalculated its strengths in commercial undertakings. Today the Northern Fleet has gone into debt by 5.1 billion rubles to just one of the repair plants. And there are now so many angry suppliers of equipment, building materials, fuel and lubricants, and other materials who are trying to break into the fleet's treasury. But what is there to break into if it is already empty?

The fleet has essentially been forced to freeze housing construction, social infrastructure facilities, and the preparation of communications for the winter. It could happen that remote garrisons will winter without a reserve of fuel and building materials. The period of navigation is coming to an end and there is no money to acquire what they need. And if one sees this information as ordinary, he simply does not know the Arctic.

A particular problem is that of the disposal of nuclear reactors on nuclear-powered vessels. Boris Isayev reported that the fleet does not have the means to "render harmless" the "nuclear squadron" that has exhausted itself. Because of the concentration of written-off reactors, it is time officially to declare the Arctic a zone of ecological disaster.

And despite all of this the commission has come to the conclusion that the Northern Fleet is continuing to perform its main task: It maintains military readiness at the necessary level. Although it is clear to all of us: The "financial blockade" of the battle fleet cannot fail to have irreversible fateful consequences for its combat readiness. And people, as strong as they may be and as much as they may love their work, cannot endlessly suffer a humiliating shortage of money or tell their families every day that "soon everything will clear up", and so on.

As I understood it, there is complete agreement in the commission in its assessment of the position of the fleet. Boris Mikhaylovich told me that in a draft decree on this matter, it is planned to obligate the Government of the Russian Federation to resolve the problem of the financing of the Northern Fleet very soon and the corresponding parliamentary committees in the commission to improve the prevailing legislation. (Neither the law "On the Status of Servicemen", nor "On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service", or other legal acts providing social protection to the military man work fully in the north). If a decree is passed, of course, it is some sign of attention by the state to its main naval defender that is in trouble. But it may be that our legislators will be interested in the very exclusivity of the situation; namely, that the battle fleet is acting in the role of a debtor. What does it owe and to whom? Nothing and to no one. Its business is the guaranteed provision of the security of the state.

And the business of the state is the guaranteed provision of everything that its defender needs. What must be the system be for this "guaranteed provision"? I am not a specialist and therefore will not say. But I know very well: It is not the fleet that must settle accounts with the ship repair plants and with suppliers of fuel and sailors' shirts. It must merely receive the various items in time, without which it is impossible for it to function normally.

There is much in our reality that is depressing, but especially the necessity of discussing banal and indisputable truths. It is as though we are re-learning such concepts as "fatherland," "security of the country," and "interests of the state." And while we are discussing this and talking from the high platform about the need to introduce taxes on excess profit and about social justice and the fight against corruption, a quite specific fleet, combat-ready, with a relatively short but brilliant history, a pathfinder in the world oceans, and conqueror of the Arctic—in short, a worker among workers—stands before the seven polar winds and waits with outstretched hand to be noticed by its native land.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Maj-Gen Anokhin Describes ROSTO

93UM0855A Moscow MILITARY NEWS BULLETIN in English No 7 (19), Jul 93 pp 5-1—5-2

[Article by Major-General Alexei Anokhin, chairman of the Central Council of the Russian Defense Sport-Technical Organization (ROSTO): "Our Main Task Is To Educate Patriots"]

[Text] In the first place, I would like to explain what ROSTO actually is and how it appeared. The organization was founded on September 25, 1991 at the first constituent congress of Russia's republican, territorial and regional organizations in connection with the re-organization of DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force and Navy). Thereby, the Russian organizations of the defence society realized their right to set up a single national organization and elect its central leading bodies.

ROSTO is an independent public organization, which acts in full compliance with the constitution and laws of the Russian Federation and its own rules. The new edition was registered with the Ministry of Justice on April 23, 1993. Organizationally, it is built on the territorial and production principle. ROSTO consists of primary, area, city, district, regional, territorial and republican organizations.

The highest leading body of ROSTO is its congress: It is convened by the Central Council at least once every seven years. Between the congresses, the leading body is the Central Council elected by the congress.

To describe the scale and structure of our organization, I will have to cite some figures. ROSTO consists of the Central Council, 21 republican, 6 territorial, 51 regional, 10 area, 479 city and 1,746 district organizations, as well as the ROSTO organization of the city of Moscow. Today our organization has 12.5 million individual and 389 group members.

The defence organization sets itself fairly vast and important tasks. I don't think it worthwhile to enumerate all of them, but it must be said that they are directed at inculcating in Russians and, above all, in young Russians, the spirit of patriotism, a love for their fatherland and readiness to defend it.

While retaining the general defence orientation in our work, we stress in particular the organization's technical and sports activity, which is particularly well received by young people. This is evidenced by the thousands of people, mostly youngsters, who attend our aviation sports festivals and various competitions in sports with a technical basis.

This interest is quite natural, for it is just as natural that many young men, who are about to be recruited to the Armed Forces, go in for applied and technical types of sports. These sports develop qualities and skills important for the future soldier and also give young people the chance to master, to a certain degree, one or another military speciality. With a view to this fact, we are developing 22 technical types of sports. Our young people have almost 3,000 technical-sports, 157 aviation and hang-gliding clubs, as well as 111 sports and technical clubs for children and teenagers. Of course, it is extremely difficult to run such clubs and schools in the country's current economic situation, but we will stop at no expense in such a sacred undertaking as bringing up patriots and Russia's future defenders.

But we do not depend on sports alone to educate our young people.

There are special automobile, technical, navigation and radio-technical schools and air clubs, which train specialists for the Armed Forces and the national economy. The 48 authorized aviation-sports organizations alone train annually 1,500 young men for entry into higher aviation schools.

In our patriotic training of young people, we do not confine ourselves to our schools, clubs and other educational organizations alone. We seek to involve the broad masses of young people in our work. In this respect the memorial competitions for prizes named after war and labour heroes offer an excellent opportunity. Such competitions are held throughout Russia and are very popular among young people.

At the beginning of 1993, the bureau of the board of the ROSTO Central Council adopted a decree on measures to train youngsters for the 50th anniversary of the landmarks in the history of World War II. The fulfilment of that decree is under the constant control

of the Central Council and the heads of local organizations. It goes without saying that hundreds of thousands of young people throughout Russia will take part in the projected undertakings.

All the aforesaid is not the only aspect of our organization's work. It also supports the activity of state bodies and institutions in the organization and implementation of rescue work, prevention and elimination of the consequences of natural calamities and other emergencies; creation of the requisite conditions to enhance the professional skills of people engaged in the sports and production spheres involving modern technology; this also includes promotion of the development of various forms of the organization of research, production, educational, methodological and other work in the sphere of technical creativity, technical and applied types of sport, labour and defence training.

Consequently, you see that we have a vast range of problems to solve. It is natural that many of them require substantial material outlays. Where do we get the money to cover these expenses?

The activity of ROSTO and its organizations is financed from incomes from our councils, enterprises and organizations. Our funds are also derived from entrance fees and membership dues, incomes from publishing, production, economic and other activity, not prohibited by the law, incomes from lotteries, etc.

Apparently, we have quite a few sources of income, but it must be admitted that in the current situation the word "income" is to a certain degree only symbolic, for everybody knows the inflationary processes working in the country now. The financing of our organization's activity is becoming more and more difficult with every passing day. However, we still manage to cope with our tasks, while the overwhelming majority of sports are maintained at the expense of ROSTO's financial and economic activity. It must be frankly admitted, however, that we cannot afford to develop aviation types of sport without state subsidies. Consequently we hope that the government will help us develop this expensive type of sport.

Today, it is not easy to be an optimist, but we are sure that despite all difficulties, the Russian Defence Sports-Technical Organization will continue working successfully in our fatherland's interests.

Editor's Note: *Alexei Ivanovich Anokhin was born on February 1, 1947 in the Uvarovo village of Tambov Region. He has been in the Armed Forces since 1964. In 1980 he was attached to the DOSAAF of the USSR. Since 1991 he has been Chairman of the ROSTO Central Council.*

Motor-Transport Battalion Assists With Harvest

93UM0837 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Feliks Semyanovskiy of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the rubric "Events and Commentary": "The Motor Battalions Go Into the Breach, But the Military Does Not Want to Repeat the Mistakes of the Past"]

[Text] The gathering of the harvest this year, planned by the staff for the supervision of the motor transport battalions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, looks like a well-prepared strategic operation, in the words of commanding officer Major-General Sergey Bogomolov. All factors to support its successful outcome were allowed for and taken into account. The actions of the servicemen were moreover supported by the operational staff for the gathering of the harvest of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha.

As always, the harvest of grain, potatoes and vegetable crops occupies the leading place in this year's harvest rush. The manpower of military transport was thus sent into that area of work. Hundreds of runs with the harvested crops have already been made—in places where the leaders of the local administrations and heads of the farms have concluded contracts with the military.

There were, for example, 450 trucks working at the start of September in Volgograd Oblast alone that had hauled 88,300 tonnes of agricultural produce, including 70,600 tonnes of grain. Another 400 trucks have also gotten to work in Novosibirsk Oblast, and 400 more in Khabarovsk Kray. But these seemingly enormous figures nonetheless force one to think, since all of these vehicles constitute a little less than a fourth of the planned levels. How will the rest be put into action?

It is no secret that the situation changes every day at the harvest front. New people who do not have sufficient experience in organizing the harvest and interacting with the military have come to lead the administrations of a number of oblasts. They have simply refused to conclude contracts as a result. A truck battalion from the Leningrad Military District, for example, was designated for work in Penza Oblast. However, the first deputy head of the oblast administration, Yuriy Vechkasov, refused it. Today, when the situation with the harvest has worsened, he is sending "tearful" telegrams to the center with the request to send the military for the harvest.

The oblast administrations have changes, but the military have been restructured as well. The trucking battalions are not idle today, but a large portion of the vehicles are in reserve in coordination with the operational staff of the Council of Ministers, ready to go

where they are needed when necessary to haul grain or vegetables. In all, there are just 4,050 such vehicles in reserve. But there are 5,250 vehicles in readiness to depart.

I would like to mention, in conclusion, an important factor of valuing the use of military hardware. The use of a ZIL-130, for example, costs just 19,000 rubles, while a GAZ-66 is 14,000, an URAL-375 is 24,000, a KamAZ is 30,000 and a KamAZ with a trailer is 40,000. Moreover, these figures include NDS, average

pay and increased operating expenditures. Meanwhile, civilian organizations, (according to reports from Rostov and Volgograd oblasts), get 110,000—115,000 rubles for the use of similar vehicles for a work shift. Perhaps the military should give that some thought?

For now, one may state with confidence that the work in the fields continues. And, as always, the military truckers will do everything that depends on them to see that the entire harvest is brought in.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russo-Ukrainian Efforts To Resolve Economic, Military, Naval Issues

Russian Views of Three Major Problems

93UM08194 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 3 Sep 93 p 7

[Article by Igor Sukhanov: "Russia-Ukraine: Three Major Points of Contradiction"]

[Text] The upcoming meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk evoked numerous comments long before the exact date of the summit was announced. Due to the irresponsible statements of politicians and the awkward actions of authorities, a gulf of misunderstanding has emerged between the two neighboring countries that is dangerously widening and deepening literally with each passing day. The main points of contradiction involve such fateful problems as nuclear weapons, the Black Sea Fleet, and the economy. Discussions be being held around these three points at the meetings of state delegations. Without a doubt, they will also become the subject of negotiations between Yeltsin and Kravchuk at Mukhalatka.

Forecasts of the results of the Crimean summit, as a rule, are also far from optimistic. The opinion is expressed that this summit will become a distinctive act of political courtesy. Yeltsin and Kravchuk, they say, will once again talk about the problems, pose for TV and photo cameras, and possibly even sign a new political declaration. But they will not be able to make any real progress in resolving the contradictions.

Unfortunately, there are grounds for such conclusions. The numerous statements by the leaders of Ukraine indicate that it is advantageous for the country's political leadership to maintain strained relations with Russia. Therefore, they are stubbornly putting into people's minds the thesis about Moscow's imperial appetites and about Russia's desire to subjugate Ukraine politically and economically. Therefore, they say, Ukraine cannot make concessions on questions of nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet. As far as the economy is concerned, in Kiev they repeat tirelessly: Russia, possessing a monopoly on energy-bearing raw materials, has tightened the noose around the necks of its partners and is trying to dictate its economic will on a sovereign state.

Perhaps these fears are indeed justified?

Nuclear Weapons

As we know, Ukraine's status as a non-nuclear state is backed up by L. Kravchuk's signature on the decision of the heads of state of the CIS on participation in the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, by edict of this same president of Ukraine of 5

April 1992 and then by order of the minister of defense of Ukraine of 23 April 1992, the 43d Missile Army and 46th Air Army with combat units (176 missile launcher systems and 43 strategic bombers) were included as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In May of that same year, personnel of two nuclear technical units of the 46th Air Army (about 670 strategic nuclear weapons) were forced to take the Ukrainian oath. Then flight personnel of all strategic bombers were forced to pledge allegiance to Ukraine. In January 1993, a special subunit was created in the structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces—the Center for Administrative Command and Control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces.

Political maneuvering by leaders in Kiev has been taking place parallel with the process of "military-administrative" resubordination of the nuclear forces. On 30 December 1991, L. Kravchuk signed the Agreement Between the CIS States on Strategic Forces, which states that until their total destruction, nuclear weapons are simply located on the territory of Ukraine, but are under the jurisdiction of the Joint Command of the CIS Strategic Forces. But on 30 January 1993, at the Worldwide Economic Forum in Davos, that same L. Kravchuk said that the nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine do not belong to any state other than Ukraine and "have just been transferred to the operational control of the Joint Command of the CIS Strategic Forces."

The 180-degree turn in the top leader's policy evoked identical statements from other Ukrainian politicians. Fulfillment of international commitments made under the Lisbon Protocol regarding nuclear weapons has been indefinitely delayed.

Despite this, Russia remains willing to cooperate with Ukraine and to maintain the system of logistical support of a guaranteed and author's supervision of the operation of the nuclear missile complexes. Thanks to the Russian experts, a draft of a corresponding agreement has been ready long ago. But, as they say, things are right where they started.

The last meeting between the two state delegations was held in Kiev in the first half of August. The texts of documents governing the procedure for dismantling the strategic nuclear forces were again discussed. The basic principles of compensation for active nuclear materials and for the dismantling itself have been endorsed. The Russian state delegation, quite satisfied with the results of the meeting with their colleagues, returned to Moscow. Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, speaking in Stockholm, stated with good reason that a "decisive breakthrough" had been achieved in the negotiations on nuclear weapons and an agreement on dismantling the missiles located on the territory of Ukraine will be signed in the near future. Then the unexpected happened: Minister of Defense Konstantin Morozov categorically refuted Kozyrev's words, telling a Reuters

correspondent that it was the "first he has heard" about the impending signing of an agreement on nuclear weapons and that no official negotiations have been conducted with Moscow on this question. Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Zlenko was altogether startling with his statement: "It would be premature to speak of any treaty with Russia on nuclear weapons."

So, can we assume after such categorical assessments that any significant documents on dismantling nuclear weapons will be signed at the upcoming summit between Yeltsin and Kravchuk? After all, during June and July 1993, this document could have been signed three times: on 24 June during Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Kiev, several days later when the Russian prime minister arrived in Kharkov, and finally on 10 July at a meeting in Moscow between the heads of government of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In all cases, the Ukrainian politicians avoided this procedure.

The Black Sea Fleet

The situation with dividing up the Black Sea Fleet is a mirror image of the preceding situation. As with the nuclear weapons, L. Kravchuk initially agreed with transferring to Ukraine only 20 percent of the Black Sea Fleet ships and the infrastructure necessary for them; then Ukraine's claims increased to 91 percent of the ships and shore facilities.

True, on 17 June 1993, again largely thanks to the efforts of the Russian diplomats and military experts, a qualitative breakthrough was made in the negotiations. On this day, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia signed the Agreement Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Urgent Measures for Formation of the Russian Navy and Ukrainian Naval Forces Based on the Black Sea Fleet. The following basic principles of the division are specified in it:

a) formations and units of all arms of fleet forces—surface ships, submarines, air forces, coastal troops; formations, units, institutions and operational, combat, technical, and logistical support facilities, and buildings and structures they have; armament, munitions, military equipment, and other movable property of the Black Sea Fleet as of the date of signing of a separate agreement on the division and terms of basing of the Russian Navy on the territory of Ukraine shall be divided between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on a 50-50 basis;

b) until divided, the Black Sea Fleet will continue to use the existing system of basing the Black Sea Fleet based on the Yalta Agreement;

c) the Russian side will participate in development of the social and economic sphere of Sevastopol and other populated areas of Ukraine where military units, facilities, and institutions of the Russian Navy will be

stationed; Russia's Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine's Naval Forces regard the enterprises of Crimea as their technical base;

d) financing of the Black Sea Fleet until it is divided is accomplished by the sides in equal shares (50 percent and 50 percent), and for the period until the Black Sea Fleet is divided, unified norms and types of pay and allowances and compensation payments which are determined by a separate agreement.

It seems that everything is provided for in the cited document, even the fact that both Russia and Ukraine will refrain from unilateral actions with respect to the Black Sea Fleet until the fleet is divided. However, politicians of both countries have not had enough restraint.

Initially Ukraine began to resubordinate individual subunits of the Black Sea Fleet to the jurisdiction of its own Naval Forces. Then on 9 July 1993, the Russian Supreme Soviet adopted the well-known edict "On the Status of the City of Sevastopol," which transferred the Black Sea Fleet base to Russian jurisdiction. In response to this, Ukraine brought into Sevastopol a battalion of naval infantry with 62 pieces of combat equipment and declared a state of combat readiness in its Naval Forces. Then the people's assembly of Sevastopol made the decision to remove Ukraine's Naval Forces beyond the city and Crimea, and announced registration of male volunteers who have gone through military training into "combat teams of 10"...

One can continue the chronicle of confrontation. The fever pitch of passions both in Crimea and in Sevastopol is growing day by day. Deputies of the Russian parliament constantly visit the Black Sea Fleet base and are already seriously talking about creating an official mission of the Russian Armed Forces in Sevastopol. The Russian parliament's decision about Sevastopol became the subject of consideration at the UN Security Council. The issue was included on the Security Council's agenda, and its chairman recommended the Russia review the decision. The deputies, of course, ignored the UN Security Council chairman's recommendation. However, the position of the prestigious international body gave Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zlenko the opportunity to state that the Security Council's decision on Sevastopol is the most remarkable victory of young Ukrainian diplomacy.

In other words, the dispute between Russia and Ukraine on dividing the Black Sea Fleet has been given a new impetus. It is quite possible that presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk will have to begin coordinating anew the procedure for dividing the Black Sea Fleet.

The Economy

As ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI has already written many times, the most critical economic contradictions between Ukraine and Russia are linked to the non-payment for

Russian energy-bearing raw materials and the failure to observe the treaties on mutual deliveries of various products.

Last week, in connection with the growing amount of indebtedness, which has already surpassed the astronomical sum of 750 billion rubles, Russia has already begun to reduce deliveries of gas to Ukraine. From all appearances, in the near future they will be reduced to 30 million cubic meters a day, although quite recently Ukraine's daily "norm" was 230 million cubic meters.

Kiev is throwing up its hands: There is no money with which to pay. However, in the opinion of competent experts, there simply are no insolvent countries. If there is no money, the debt can be paid by another method, including by transferring to Russia part of Ukrainian property.

In the case with gas, for example, this may involve underground gas-storage facilities located on the territory of Ukraine and supplying Russian gas to Russian export gas pipelines. However, such proposals are met with extreme hostility in Kiev.

In addition, Ukraine chronically fails to fulfill contracts on deliveries of various types of products, although it constantly complains about Russia's lack of discipline in this context.

An example of this is the huge delivery shortfalls on the part of Ukraine for such a socially "strategic" product as sugar. A bilateral agreement called for exporting from Ukraine to Russia 1,035,000 tonnes of sugar in 1993. However, to date only 28 percent of the stipulated amount—285,300 tonnes—have been delivered.

Things are also lamentable with other goods. Figures comment best on the situation.

Table 1. Preliminary Data on Deliveries of Production and Technical Products Under Intergovernmental Agreements to the Russian Federation from Ukraine During the First Six Months of 1993

Product	Percentage of Fulfillment of Agreement for Deliveries
Coal	4
Manganese ore	36
Metallurgical coke	36
Ferrous metal scrap and waste	2
Steel-making pig iron	32
Foundry pig iron	20
Ferrous metal rolled stock	21
Steel pipe	24
Soda ash	26
Trucks	31
Tractors	34
Cement	5

Table 2. Preliminary Data on Deliveries of Production and Technical Products Under Intergovernmental Agreements from the Russian Federation to Ukraine During the First Six Months of 1993

Product	Percentage of Fulfillment of Agreement for Deliveries
Petroleum	46
Natural gas	45
Liquefied gas	42
Coal	89
Automotive gasoline	99
Diesel fuel	59
Diesel oil	44
Furnace fuel oil	210

Lately, the position taken by Russia in negotiations with Ukraine is often cursed. Russian critics [fault them] for insufficient firmness in defending the power's interests, and their Ukrainian colleagues, on the contrary, for excessive rigidity.

But, apparently, the truth lies elsewhere. First, the task (in the opinion of the leader of the Russian state delegation at the negotiations with Ukraine, Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin) is not to delay resolution of the entire complex of problems that have emerged between Russia and Ukraine. Delaying will only complicate matters. Second, to normalize relations between our countries, we must transfer them to within the framework of usual interstate contacts. Let the peoples themselves strengthen brotherhood and friendship between Ukrainians and Russians. As far as political and economic problems are concerned, their solution should have been approached long ago from the standpoint of world standards, without allowances for "special fraternal" relations between countries. In other words, follow the old Russian proverb: "Friendship is friendship, but business is business."

Efforts To Resolve Fate of Black Sea Fleet

93UM0819B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Sep 93 p 7

[Article by Capt 2d Rank Yevgeniy Vodopyanov: "Whose Band Will Play First? The Meeting Between B. Yeltsin and L. Kravchuk on Problems of Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet Will Be Held Today."]

[Text] On the eve of Navy Day, a crowd of pro-Ukrainian residents holding their rally in the vicinity of Minnaya Stenka partitioned off the part of the road used for traffic, trying to detain the "Volga" with the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral E. Baltin. In doing so, one of the rally participants called for the people to smash the car, but was stopped by the police. The person arrested turned out to be an officer from one of the units of the Ukrainian Naval Forces, Major N. Gorlov.

This is why I cannot agree with the opinion of certain newspapers that hasten to exclusively accuse Russian legislators and pro-Russian urban radicals of stirring up passions in the city. The opposing side is also doing its bit in this: The sociopolitical trend UNA (Ukrainian National Assembly), which became one of the initiators of creating militarized UNSO (Ukrainian National Self-Defense) formations, whose main staff instructions provide for combat training. This includes studying the area of operations, renewing skills in handling firearms (combat and hunting), and making bottles and containers with napalm.

The leaders of the UNSO do not hide the fact that they are counting on the "strong authority of the military," about which the "commander in chief" of UNSO, Yu. Shukhevich, spoke. They would not be adverse to the UNA receiving the Black Sea Fleet. On this point, the assembly even is developing a military-strategic concept of its organizational development and use, not concealing the fact that the Black Sea Fleet is to operate exclusively against Russia.

A military structure called "Varta" is being created and the association DSU [Derzhavna samostiyist Ukrainy] is registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) also declared the creation of its own military formations. True, this involves organizations operating basically in Western Ukraine. But according to information received at the press center of the Black Sea Fleet, for a long time groups of Spetsnaz servicemen from Western Ukraine have been arriving at one of the units stationed in Feodosiya under the guise of civilians. There are already about 100 of these people. Add 62 armored transport vehicles and two reconnaissance vehicles, arriving in Sevastopol in two troop trains together with subunits of the Airborne Troops of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and now based in the village of Tylovoe, a 30 to 40 minute march from the city, a fully manned army corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stationed in Crimea...

In Sevastopol itself, there are also quite a few pro-Ukrainian associations of citizens: The Sevastopol organization Rukh and "Prosvet" and the equally well-known Union of Officers of Ukraine... And although the largest of the associations of "Prosvet" numbers only 150 members, in the words of a representative of the president of Ukraine and head of the city administration in Sevastopol, I. Yermakov, they would not be adverse to creating their own city soviet. According to the statements of Ivan Fedosovich, the Crimean-Tatar Parliament [medzhlis] also lays claim to its own body of city administration.

As we know, the economy determines policy. It is economic reasons that are pushing people to Nakhimov Square, where the majority of the rallies are being held; or are forcing them to sit for days at the corner of the street with the same name, gathering

signatures for holding a referendum of no confidence in the city soviet and the Supreme Soviet of Crimea

Strange affairs are being created with financing. The fleet commander, for example, received in rubles what a warrant officer receives in Russia. The official rate of exchange of the Russian ruble to the Ukrainian karbovanets was 1:1.4 until recently. However, for Black Sea Fleet sailors, for some reason the conversion is 1:2.2 and until June was 1:1.9. Where is the rest of the money going? If we recognize today that Sevastopol is a Ukrainian city (I have in mind the dissociation of the executive bodies of Russia from the decision of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on the status of Sevastopol), the Black Sea Fleet sailors should be paid the way the servicemen of the Western Group of Forces, say, are paid: In local currency and in rubles. Today, it is a whole problem even to go on temporary duty to Russia. Rubles can be obtained only with personal authorization of the commander and chief of the fleet finance department. And the amount that is given is enough only for the halfway point. The deputy chief of the Black Sea Fleet Personnel Directorate, Captain 1st Rank A. Osokin, told this story: The executive officer of a submarine was forced to work one week as...a stevedore in order to return from St. Petersburg, where he was studying at higher officer courses. In general, the Black Sea Fleet, as expressed by the chairman of the coordination council of the Officer Meetings of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank V. Volodin, can be entered in the Guinness Book of Records: For the first time in world practice, the commander of the fleet, Admiral I. Kasatonov, was transferred from this position, and Admiral E. Baltin was appointed to it by edicts of two presidents. The latter is not subordinate either to the Russian or the Ukrainian ministers of defense. For the first time in the world, a fleet is controlled by the presidents of two independent states, and the fleet lives under the laws of both Russian and Ukraine...

But if the above can be characterized as an organized complex legal case, the presence, say, in Sevastopol of two headquarters or two commandant's offices in no way contributes to the normal functioning of the fleet and the garrison. This, incidentally, was also confirmed by Captain 3d Rank a. Galaktionov, garrison commandant from the Russian side. Situations become comical when questions arise: Whose honor guard will take the first step during or whose band will play first?

In the words of everyone with whom I talked, the meeting between the two presidents, on which the Black Sea Fleet sailors placed such hopes, also did not provide a way out of the impasse in which Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet have been driven today. The signed agreement gave rise to more questions than answers.

That is why the ships, which on the day of my departure were again lined up on the roadstead to serve as a background for the widely advertised night concert "Zvezdnyy priboy" ["Star Surf"], did not at all look festive. It seemed

the gray hulks were sullenly frozen in Sevastopol Bay in deep meditation, like their inhabitants: Where to sail?"

Russia-Ukraine Warhead Salvage Agreement

93V'C0115A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 22 Sep 93 p 3

["Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the Salvaging of Nuclear Warheads"]

[Text] The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine, hereinafter called the Parties, confirming the Parties' commitment to a strengthening of the international conditions of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons on the basis of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1 July 1968, taking into consideration the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on a Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 31 July 1991 and the documents connected therewith and taking into consideration the Agreement Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Procedure of the Relocation of Nuclear Munitions From the Territory of Ukraine to Central Pre-Plant Bases of the Russian Federation for Their Disassembly and Destruction of 18 April 1992, have agreed the following:

Article 1

For the purposes of this agreement the terms adduced below have the following meaning:

- "nuclear warhead"—the reentry vehicle of munitions, located on the territory of Ukraine, containing nuclear materials housed in a single structure;
- "nuclear fuel for nuclear electric power stations (AES)"—material containing fissionable nuclides with an isotope of uranium-235 concentration of not more than 4.4 percent, which, inserted in a nuclear reactor, permits a chain nuclear reaction;
- "highly enriched uranium (VOU)"—uranium with a content of an isotope of uranium-235 with a mass equal to or more than 20 percent;
- "low-enriched uranium (NOU)"—uranium with a content of an isotope of uranium-235 with a mass ranging from 4.4 to 20 percent;
- "fuel assembly (TVS)"—assembly of fuel elements (TVEL's) constituting a single whole and not separable from one another at the time of core charging, irradiation, and discharging;
- "fuel element (TVEL)"—element of the fuel assembly consisting of the nuclear fuel proper and the fuel jacket and providing for the reliable transmission of heat from the fuel to the coolant;
- "salvaging of nuclear weapons"—the process of disassembly, shipment, storage, and reprocessing for the use for peaceful purposes of the components of the nuclear warheads.

Article 2

1. The Russian Federation shall provide for the salvaging of all nuclear warheads located in Ukraine.
2. The Russian Federation shall provide for the reprocessing of the highly enriched uranium obtained as a result of the salvaging of the nuclear warheads into low-enriched uranium, which will be used for the manufacture of fuel assemblies for the nuclear power stations of Ukraine or for other peaceful purposes.

Article 3

1. Supplies of fuel assemblies from the Russian Federation for the nuclear electric power stations of Ukraine shall be undertaken on the understanding that Ukraine will place its nuclear activity under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
2. To achieve the purposes set forth in Article 2 of this agreement the Parties shall conclude a contract. The contract shall be concluded within six months after this agreement has taken effect. If necessary, the Parties may conclude additional contracts in accordance with this agreement.
3. In the event of some differences between this agreement and the contracts concluded in accordance with this agreement, the provisions of this agreement shall take precedence.

Article 4

Each Party shall appoint executive authorities for realization of this agreement. For the Russian Federation the executive authority responsible for the dismantling and shipment of the nuclear weapons is the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and for the processing, storage, and payments, the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, and for Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense and the State Committee of Ukraine for the Use of Nuclear Energy. Each Party is entitled to replace the executive authority by way of 30-day advance notification of the other Party in writing.

Article 5

For fulfillment of this agreement the Parties shall ensure the unimpeded entry and exit of the Parties' personnel and grant various reciprocal tax privileges to be agreed between the Parties.

Article 6

1. This agreement will take effect as of the date of the Parties' exchange of notification of their fulfillment of the intrastate procedures necessary for the agreement to come into force.

This agreement will operate with regard for the Parties' corresponding international commitments and will

remain in force for 30 years. The term of this agreement may be altered upon the Parties' agreement in writing.

2. This agreement may be supplemented or revised with the consent of its signatories.

3. This agreement may be terminated one year following the receipt of notice of this from either Party in writing.

4. Done in Yalta on 3 September 1993 in two copies, each in Russian and Ukrainian, both versions being equally valid, what is more.

For the Government of the Russian Federation
[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin

For the Government of Ukraine
[Signed] L. Kuchma

'Basic Principles' of Warhead Agreement

93WCD115B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 22 Sep 93 p 3

["Basic Principles of the Salvaging of Nuclear Warheads of the Strategic Nuclear Forces Located in Ukraine"]

[Text] The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine, hereinafter called the Parties, have agreed on the basic principles of the salvaging of nuclear warheads of the strategic nuclear forces located in Ukraine:

1. Dismantling and Shipment

a) The Parties shall ensure the conditions for the Parties' removal of all types of nuclear warheads of ICBM's and the relocation of these warheads and also the post-boost vehicles of nuclear ALCM's to the territory of the Russian Federation for disassembly and salvage.

b) The executive authorities of the Parties shall cooperate in the withdrawal, shipment, and storage of these warheads, guided by the provisions of the Agreement Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Procedure for the Relocation of Nuclear Munitions From the Territory of Ukraine to the Central Pre-Plant Bases of the Russian Federation for Their Disassembly and Destruction of 1992.

c) The Parties shall ensure safety in the process of the maintenance and removal of the nuclear warheads from the missiles and during their shipment in accordance with the current requirements and rules of the nuclear weapon standard manuals. The nuclear warheads here shall be shipped by the forces and resources of the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian side shall be responsible for the creation of secure conditions for the movement of the nuclear warheads on its territory.

d) Work on fulfillment of clause 1 shall be performed according to a schedule which will be drawn up by the Parties and approved by the Parties' heads of government. Account shall be taken here of the need for the dismantling first and foremost of the nuclear warheads whose terms of service or the storage of reentry vehicles and individual components thereof has expired. The withdrawal of each nuclear warhead from Ukraine to the Russian Federation shall be compensated within one year following the date on which the warhead crosses the border between the Parties.

2. Procedure for Compensation for the Cost of the Nuclear Materials

a) The entire highly enriched uranium (approximately 50 m.t. [expansion unknown] of VOU) recovered in accordance with this agreement from the nuclear warheads shall be reprocessed in the Russian Federation into low-enriched uranium (NOU).

b) The principles of the payments for the uranium will include the following:

b.1. Neither Party shall subsidize the other.

b.2. A commercial deal—no profit or loss, "evens".

b.3. Prices and costs with regard for inflation and changes in the world market.

b.4. The Russian Federation shall supply Ukraine with fuel assemblies (TVS) for nuclear electric power stations (AES). The Russian Federation shall be compensated for expenditure on supplies of TVS for Ukraine from the sale of some of the uranium recovered from the strategic nuclear warheads located in Ukraine.

c) The weapons-grade plutonium recovered from the strategic warheads located in Ukraine shall be warehoused in the Russian Federation until the Parties have adopted a decision on the salvaging thereof.

Ukraine shall receive the cost of the weapons-grade plutonium as it is sold, minus the costs and expenditure of the Russian Federation on its salvage.

d) The nonnuclear components of the strategic nuclear weapons recovered from the nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine shall be salvaged in accordance with the Parties' agreement.

e) The Parties shall ensure measures of transparency concerning computation of the nuclear material and its cost at the time of sale in accordance with clauses a, b.4., and c.

f) TVS for the AES of Ukraine shall be supplied on the basis of annual contracts between the Parties' executive authorities.

g) In the event of the sale on the world market of the uranium released from a warhead located on the territory of Ukraine, trilateral agreements guaranteeing the

Parties the receipt of the corresponding parts of the cost of the products may be concluded.

These basic principles have equal validity with the Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the Salvaging of Nuclear Warheads of 3 September 1993.

For the Government of the Russian Federation
[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin

For the Government of Ukraine
[Signed] L. Kuchma

Missile Maintenance Supervision Agreement

93WC0115C Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 22 Sep 93 p 3

["Agreement Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Procedure for the Exercise of Warranty and Inventor's Supervision of the Maintenance of the Strategic Missile Systems of the Strategic Forces Located on Their Territories"]

[Text] The Russian Federation and Ukraine, hereinafter called the Parties, guided by the need to ensure nuclear and environmental safety, exclude the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons and maintain in the proper technical condition the strategic missile systems of the strategic forces located on their territories, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Work on the warranty and inventor's supervision of the maintenance of the strategic missile systems of the strategic forces located on the territories of the Parties shall be performed by specialists of the developer enterprises and manufacturers of these systems and also of the systems and units which are a part of them, regardless of the territory of which Party on which they deployed.

Article 2

Enterprises of the Parties performing the work on warranty and inventor's supervision in accordance with this agreement shall be guided by the legislation of the Parties and also the following documents:

- Basic Conditions for the Supply of Products for Military Organizations;
- Regulations Governing Warranty Supervision of the Technical Condition of OS-Type Systems
- Regulations Governing Warranty Supervision of the Technical Condition of 15P645-Type Systems (for the 15P158 System);

- Regulations Governing Warranty Supervision of the Technical Condition of 15P961-Type Systems;
- Regulations Governing Warranty Supervision of the Technical Condition of the R-Type System;
- Regulations Governing the Drafting of Messages, Supply of Records and Materiel, Planning and Updating in the Services;
- All-Union State Standard V15.704-83. Inventor's Supervision in the Process of Maintenance. Basic Provisions;
- All-Union State Standard V15.703-78. Procedure of Submittal and Satisfaction of Complaints;
- Regulations Governing the Types, Procedure and Organization of Work on Warranty Supervision of Type-R Systems at Naval Facilities;
- Regulations Governing the Supply of Industrial Engineering Products;
- All-Union State Standard V22.027-82. Systems, Missile-Strategic and Space-Related. Procedure for Claims Work at Industrial Enterprises;
- Regulations Governing the Participation of Representatives of Industry in Work at Missile Forces' Facilities

Article 3

The functions performed earlier by the ministries of general machine building and defense industry of the USSR in respect to warranty and inventor's supervision shall be entrusted:

- For the Russian Federation; to the Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry;
- For Ukraine; to the Ministry of Machine Building of the Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion.

Article 4

The extent of the work and costs on warranty and inventor's supervision of the maintenance of the strategic missile systems of the strategic forces shall be determined by a plan of warranty and inventor's supervision drawn up by the Committee of the Russian Federation for the Defense Sectors of Industry based on source data of the Strategic Missile Forces, the Navy, and the head developer enterprises and shall be coordinated with the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Machine Building of the Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion of Ukraine for the strategic missile systems of the strategic forces located on its territory.

The work on warranty and inventor's supervision of the strategic missile systems of the strategic forces will be funded by the Strategic Missile Forces Command, which will receive from the Parties to this end funds in the amounts determined by the concerted plan of work on warranty and inventor's supervision.

The Parties shall transfer funds for performance of the work in accordance with the procedure they establish. The allocated funds shall be indexed quarterly with regard for the actual level of inflation. The command of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy shall conclude contracts with the head developer enterprises and manufacturers for performance of the work on warranty and inventor's supervision of the maintenance of the missile systems of the strategic forces with regard for assurance of funding for the upkeep of the testing-unit facilities and engineering-technical personnel at the industrial enterprises catering for the performance of this work.

Article 5

Access to the facilities for work on warranty and inventor's supervision shall be secured following consultation with the Ministry of Defense of the Party on whose territory these facilities are located. The Parties shall undertake to ensure unimpeded entry onto and exit from the territory of the Parties of the equipment and materials necessary for the performance of this work.

Article 6

This agreement shall take effect as of the moment it is signed and will remain in force until the maintenance of the strategic missile systems of the strategic forces is complete.

[This documented was] completed in Yalta on 3 September 1933 in two copies, each in Russian and Ukrainian, with both versions being equally valid.

For the Russian Federation
[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin

For Ukraine

[Signed] L. Kuchma

BELARUS

Chief of Main Staff Churkin on 'National Extremism' in Military

93UM0860A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Sep 93 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Nikolay Churkin, chief of main staff, Belarussian Republic Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel Valeriy Kovalev: "National Extremists Dislike Our Army"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The chief of main staff of the Belarussian Armed Forces answers questions put by a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

[Kovalev] About 18 months have passed since sovereign Belarus initiated the creation of her own Armed

Forces. That is a short period of time for a matter of this scale, to be sure, but some results may already be discussed.

[Churkin] Well, why not. Let us discuss what has been accomplished. The Belarussian Supreme Soviet has drawn up and adopted a military doctrine, decided on the structure, makeup, and personnel strength of the Armed Forces, and approved a phased program for reforming the latter.

We succeeded in forming, in a conflict-free environment, an officer corps for the republic's army on the basis of Belarussian citizenship. The process of troop reduction and reorganization is proceeding according to plan. Reformation of units and formations is approaching virtual completion. In this connection, we decided not to organize along the lines of such cumbersome operational-tactical structures as the army and division, preferring instead the corps and brigade arrangement, which is more suitable to relatively small armed forces. We started out by setting up a mechanized brigade by reorganizing a tank division on the basis of a special table of organization and equipment, allowing the brigade time to train the personnel, then having the brigade carry out experimental tactical training.

We also decided not to adopt the so-called "reduced-strength" unit plan. The "paper" regiments and divisions did not actually engage in combat training, since the manning was sufficient only for performing guard and routine garrison duties and maintaining weapons and equipment in combat-ready condition. We will not have that kind of unit in our army. We took the route of creating units and formations that are in a state of constant combat readiness, with their personnel strength such that they can undergo thorough training, carry out their duties, and, if need be, take up combat activities without delay.

[Kovalev] Do you mean to say that the process of creating the Armed Forces is proceeding easily and simply?

[Churkin] We have many problems. The main one is financial. The Ministry of Defense is experiencing an acute shortage of funds. The republic's difficult economic and financial situation has caused the military budget to be cut to the bone. For the year we have been allotted 50 billion rubles - half that required to satisfy the Armed Forces' high-priority requirements. This situation forces us to tighten our belt in the case of literally each and every item. We have virtually stopped purchasing weapons and equipment. We have reduced the operating time of motor vehicles by 50 percent, limited the number of tactical exercises, kept track of every round of ammunition and missile, and have switched to the use of training simulators. We are

working through the Ministry of Defense's Commercial Directorate to sell surplus military and technical property and real estate located on military installations, and we are downsizing the management apparatus. In a word, we are waging a difficult struggle for survival under conditions of financial starvation.

There are other problems. Nonetheless, the republic's army is definitely taking shape. The army already constitutes a combat-ready, well-managed, coordinated body; one that can, if necessary, defend the republic's independence.

[Kovalev] Then why are certain Belarussian publications levying constant criticism on the republic's nascent army and on the Ministry of Defense?

[Churkin] The criticism is being levied largely by those who see fit to use militant nationalism. Instead of following a planned and smooth military construction process, they demand a near-instantaneous - of one of two or three months' duration - "Belarusification of the army" and a change in ethnic makeup of the officer corps, by having Belarussians on duty outside the republic's borders return to the republic in short order. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences that would ensue if those ideas were made a reality, how the future of many persons would be pitifully marred.

The Supreme Soviet and Government have chosen a different course. What they did was to take another route, one that is civilized and allows for the realities that have come about. This, however, was not to the liking of the self-appointed "specialists" in military construction. They have promoted a loud campaign against the army and Ministry of Defense. They are attempting to convince the citizens of Belarus that the idea of independence and rebirth of the republic are not favored in the Armed Forces and that a considerable proportion of the officer corps does not share the nation's interests. There is constant spreading of allegations of persecution of patriotic servicemen in units, hindrance of Belarussian officers in their attempts to return to the Motherland, and slow progress in instituting the Belarussian language in the army.

The First Congress of Belarussians of the World, which was held in the beginning of July, was utilized in an attempt to discredit the present course of military construction. Militant national extremists were responsible for the Congress' releasing the corresponding statement.

[Kovalev] Do you consider the allegations made by the national extremists to be groundless?

[Churkin] Absolutely. By taking the pledge of allegiance and becoming citizens of Belarus, the officers, regardless of their ethnic origin, have made their choice. On what basis can they be vilified by making accusations of disloyalty and unreliability on their part?

There is also no substance to allegations that the Ministry of Defense is hindering Belarussian servicemen in their attempts to return to their Motherland. In 18 months, we have welcomed and placed more than 7,000 officers - natives of the republic - and we will continue to do so. However, it must be realized that under conditions whereby the army is undergoing reduction, with plans calling for discharging almost 20,000 officers into the reserve by the year 1995, there is no ready solution to this problem. It is easy to shout out "Belarussians, return home!" as the leaders of the Belarussian Association of Servicemen have done. They have provoked people, and now they hypocritically blame the Ministry of Defense that it cannot accommodate returning personnel. This, in spite of the fact that this situation would not obtain if the process were permitted to proceed naturally.

[Kovalev] The Supreme Soviet of Belarus has passed a resolution rendering the republic a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. That also drew various reactions from the Belarussian news media.

[Churkin] The Ministry of Defense sees this particular issue clearly. Including the republic into the collective security system is entirely in line with her interests. It will be extremely difficult for Belarus to maintain an adequate level of defensive capability if she stands alone, without assistance from allies, without close military cooperation. Our Armed Forces are presently equipped with a modern arsenal of weapons inherited from the former Soviet army. But what about tomorrow, when it will require repair, modernization, replacement? The republic's defense sector does not produce weapons, ammunition, and military equipment in a ready-to-use form. Thoughts of a rapid realignment of the VPK [military-industrial complex] are out of the question. This being the situation, Belarus' participation in the collective security system is a vital necessity.

BALTIC STATES

Latvia's Defense Minister Pavlovskis Interviewed

93UM0851A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Sep 93 p 2

[Interview of the Minister of Defense of Latvia, V.V. Pavlovskis by Sr-Lt Oleg Groznetskiy, place and date not given: "The Captain Who Is Forming the New Army"]

[Text] From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reference file: Vildis-Vilnis Pavlovskis was born in 1934 in Riga and is a Latvian. In 1944 his family emigrated to Germany and in 1949 moved to the U.S. In 1957 Pavlovskis graduated from Portland University, and a year later from a U.S. Marine and Signals Officer Training School. He served as commander of an infantry training company, the commander of an administrative company, a tactics instructor in an officer training school,

an infantry company commander in South Vietnam, and as deputy chief of an infantry operations section. His military rank in the American Army was captain. In 1968 he left the service and continued his education at a polytechnical university in the state of California. He became the Deputy Minister of Defense of Latvia in February 1992, and since August 1993 has been the Minister of Defense of Latvia.

[Groznetkiy] Mr. Pavlovskis, did you have ideas which you were unable to implement as deputy minister?

[Pavlovskis] I don't think so. You see, I was not working so much directly with the defense forces as in the political sphere. I directed a department which was involved in liaison with western military organizations.

[Groznetkiy] What countries were you able to classify as potential adversaries of Latvia? And how do you assess the statements of certain Latvian politicians who think that the main military danger comes from Russia?

[Pavlovskis] I do not classify Russia as a probable adversary. We generally do not have any such. It is just that we believe that the Russian army is an army of occupation. It came here and stays here without our permission.

[Groznetkiy] Are there any other arguments supporting the thesis of military danger from our army?

[Pavlovskis] Yes. For example, as we see it, in April of this year, a scenario of occupation of Latvia was played out during Russian Army exercises. We were not even informed of this. Apart from that, Latvian military personnel have not had a single incident with the Russians. We believe that the current Russian leadership headed by President Boris Yeltsin is quite respectable and respects the norms of international law. But the political situation in Russia is unstable, and it is hard to say how events will unfold and how the Russian Army will behave in the future.

[Groznetkiy] As far as I know, the command of the Northwest Group of Forces [SZGV] has informed the Ministry of Defense of Latvia, the Office for Monitoring the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, and also the mass media about all training sessions, especially exercises. As for the "scenario of occupation of Latvia," there was no confirmation of this newspaper canard, except by assumption. It is too bad that even you believed them.

Incidentally, about the newspaper articles. Mr. Minister, what do you think about the paper DIENA publicizing the "sensational" fact of an alleged recruitment of "mercenaries" in the SZGV, citing a certain official and the ministry of defense of Latvia?

[Pavlovskis] Unfortunately, the officials of the information services do not always have a deep understanding of army matters. Nonetheless, we are concerned by the fact that the Russian army is accepting people from Latvia for service. The question could be resolved as follows: Introduce these people to us and tell us what they are involved in, and this question would not be raised at all.

[Groznetkiy] But the matter has unfolded differently. In accordance with the law of the Russian Federation (RF) "On Compulsory Military Service," starting on March 1, 1993 tactical formations and units of the SZGV began to be manned with service members and civilians who lived in Latvia but had Russian citizenship. Basically these are the wives of service members, members of their families, enlisted men and NCOs who have served out their compulsory service, and not some sort of "mercenaries from Latvia." Now the recruitment has ceased due to financial difficulties. But you must agree, this is not at all what the Riga papers were saying. Still, I don't want to get stuck on just this topic. It would be interesting to learn, for example, of your personal impressions of service in the U.S. Army. What were the specific features?

[Pavlovskis] First of all, the assignment of tasks in the American Army does not provide for descriptions of variants of implementation. This is a matter for the creativity of the executing individuals. Second, it is the direct obligation of the commander not only to accomplish the mission, but also to take care of his subordinates. In the U.S. Army, in contrast to the Russian, care of subordinates is basically the job of the corporals and sergeants, so the officers have more time for combat training. There is even a saying among the American military that sergeants and corporals are the backbone of the army.

[Groznetkiy] And what about personal example?

[Pavlovskis] I never asked anything of subordinates that I couldn't do myself.

[Groznetkiy] For many America remains the object of fierce longing, but while you, on the contrary, decided to leave it.

[Pavlovskis] I came to help Latvia, which needed people with experience in diplomatic work. First I was offered a post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then here, in the Ministry of Defense; and I accepted.

[Groznetkiy] Pardon me for what is perhaps an improper question. Do you feel comfortable in the chair of the Minister of Defense of Latvia?

[Pavlovskis] Thanks for a good question. Yes, I feel comfortable in my post. To be the deputy minister of defense and to be at the controls of the ministry of defense are two different things.

[Groznetkiy] How would you describe yourself, are you a romantic or a pragmatist?

[Pavlovskis] An idealist and a pragmatist at the same time.

[Groznetkiy] Do you have any hobbies?

[Pavlovskis] I love to read and to travel. I collect old postcards, but I now have a shortage of time for all that.

[Groznetkiy] What genre of literature do you prefer?

[Pavlovskis] Detective novels, especially writers who allow you to analyze and participate in the investigation yourself, so to speak.

From the editors: Of course one cannot agree completely with some of what the Minister of Defense of Latvia said. Nonetheless, we did not deem it necessary to correct the responses of Mr. Pavlovskis, since as we see it, this primarily gives an idea of how hard it is now for our military and diplomats to work in our neighboring states.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Reaction to U.S. Revision of FM 100-5

93UM0844A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Colonel Sergey Pechurov, candidate of military sciences: "U.S. Armed Forces Preparing to Participate in Low-Intensity Conflicts"]

[Text] Several months ago, General G. Sullivan, U.S. Army chief of staff, approved a new edition of the U.S. Army's field manual FM 100-5, entitled "Operations." This new edition is not a mere literary work, of course. It is a periodic update of the principles underlying American military thinking, of applying these principles in various degrees to the changing world situation as a whole as well as to the latest attainments made in weapons developments.

It is generally known that the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's were a time of creation of a new generation of weapons: precision weapons. Various precision-type weapons were tested during the war in Indochina and in the Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1973. In the beginning of the 1980's, this type of weapon system (with ground, air, and sea platforms) was placed into the hands of troops in units and large units of the armies of Western countries, most notably of the U.S.

The above made it possible for American strategists to work out a theoretical basis for possible realization of simultaneous destruction of an enemy's military assets throughout the length and breadth of his troop deployment. This laid the groundwork for developing and adopting the "air-ground operation," which was set down in a formal manner in the rewritten FM 100-5 in 1986. This doctrine since that time has served as guidance for administering combat training of the army, and, to a definite extent, of the U.S. Armed Forces in general. The doctrine's concepts have been applied to the development of concepts designed to evolve the armed forces of America's closest allies. All we need do is recall the concept of "second-echelon warfare," the purely NATO concept tied to the conditions associated with the European Theater of War.

At the same time, as the 1980's turned into the 1990's, it became clear that the "air-ground operation" did not completely address all aspects of troop combat activity, something that was driven home to the Americans as they carried out their numerous military actions, especially during the Persian Gulf Conflict. On top of that, the change in the global strategic military situation prompted the American military

theoreticians to reconsider the entire spectrum of possible and high-probability threats to the national security of the U.S.

As a result, the top leadership of the U.S. Armed Forces decided to rewrite field manual FM 100-5. This task was assigned to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (located in Fort Monroe, Virginia), which is the leading organization within the American Armed Forces structure. This organization is charged with all theoretical and practical aspects of training troops for the conduct of various types of wars (conflicts) on a medium or long-term basis.

It is pointed out in the manual that the period following the "cold war" is characterized by increased instability, associated with a high probability of local crises, and an equal probability of their escalation into military conflicts. In this light, the conduct of military actions under conditions of nuclear warfare is relegated to a position of secondary importance. The American Army is basing its thinking on participating in low-intensity conflicts. The latter, in the American point of view, include any troop action, from cleaning up in the aftermath of natural disasters and carrying out peacekeeping missions on the one hand, to engaging in operations of the Panama or Grenada type on the other.

In addition, the military experience the Americans have gained in the last few years has led American strategists to consider the need for a broader interpretation of the term "battlefield" proper. There are increasing discussions relative to an "operational space," in which there would be close cooperation between ground, naval, air, and space components. This is no longer an "air-ground" operation, but an "all-encompassing" operation, which is the new doctrine that is close to adoption but not yet fully refined. Incidentally, it is designed to incorporate present and future weapons systems, ones which will be placed into series production only at the turn of the century.

One more aspect is noteworthy. With the possible nature of the most probable types of military conflicts that would involve the U.S. Armed Forces, the new edition of FM 100-5 provides a fuller treatment of problems associated with redeploying contingents of troops (forces) to any area of the world to effect a quick and decisive response to "challenges" to the security of the U.S. and its allies. The text includes the idea of mandatory employment of allies in military actions beyond the borders of the respective mother country. In this connection, considerable attention is devoted to joint operations (those including allies) and combined (combined-arms) operations.

Analysis of the new manual brings out the Americans' present view of the world within the framework of military strategy. And this, of course, is of much more than mere passing interest to us.

Pentagon Plan for U.S. Armed Forces Examined

93UM0852A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Manki Ponomarev, under the rubric: "Documents": "The Pentagon's New Program: The U.S. Department of Defense Has Published the 'Fundamental Review of the Structure of the Armed Forces' Report"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported that the U.S. Department of Defense has developed a new national military organizational development program. It has been set forth in a series of Pentagon documents. The primary document is the Department of Defense Report—the "Fundamental Review of the Structure of the Armed Forces". So that our readers themselves can form an idea on the program's content, we are publishing a somewhat abridged summary of this report that in no way changes its essence. The report states:

The proposed structure of the armed forces permits the United States:

- to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts;
- to have at its disposal forces to participate in primarily multilateral peacekeeping operations;
- to have conventional forces at its disposal to maintain the U.S. military presence abroad; and,
- to ensure effective nuclear deterrence and, in the event of a threatening turn of events, to create additional forces within the framework of the SALT-2 Treaty.

Having forces that are sufficient for participation in two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts and victory in them is important because, without those forces, one could provoke a second conflict when U.S. troops will be involved in the first. In the dynamic and unpredictable contemporary world, the United States must have armed forces that have sufficient flexibility and might to deal with unforeseen threats.

While planning the overall force structure, the United States must provide for sufficient strategic transport systems to airlift troops to where they are needed when they are needed. And highly specialized units must be ready to operate simultaneously in two major conflicts. For example, the B-2, F-117, AWACS, and EF-111 aircraft, the number of which are limited, must carry out that "dual" mission.

General-Purpose Forces

They have undertaken or plan to undertake a series of measures to optimize these forces in order to increase their potential, flexibility and effectiveness. This includes increasing strategic mobility, aircraft carrier strike potential, ground forces fire power and also the

capability of heavy bombers to deliver precision-guided non-nuclear weapons to the target.

The purchase of C-17 transport aircraft to replace the obsolete C-141 will continue to optimize strategic mobility but, if they don't manage to solve the problems that have arisen with the C-17, another transport aircraft will be purchased. They plan to deploy tank units, that could be sent without delay to either the Persian Gulf or to Northeast Asia, on ships that are located outside U.S. waters. The delivery of heavy weaponry for the ground forces in Southwest Asia and Korea will be accelerated. The potential of the maritime transport fleet will be increased. The combat readiness and rapidity of reaction of reserve forces will be increased and other steps will be taken.

Strike aircraft carriers. They are examining steps to increase their fire power: a significant number of F-14 aircraft will be equipped with precision-guided weapons and they intend to rush additional squadrons of F/A-18 aircraft to forward-based aircraft carriers.

Ground forces fire power. New precision-guided munitions are being developed for ATACMS tactical missiles, multiple rocket launcher systems, universal air-to-ground missiles, and tube artillery. AH-64 Apache helicopters are being equipped with the Longbow fire control radar system.

Long-range bombers. B-1B and B-2 heavy bombers will be modernized in order to increase their capability to employ precision-guided non-nuclear weapons systems. All-weather weapons systems are being developed. This will dramatically increase strike potential and the capability to destroy the most important targets in the first days of a surprise attack.

Reserve forces. A number of steps have been taken to increase the combat readiness and flexibility of Army National Guard combat units and other reserve forces. The former are being tasked to allocate forces to reinforce combat divisions and, if required, to increase ground combat forces to prevent a second large-scale regional conflict or to participate in combat operations within the framework of that conflict. Combat proficiency and the potential and combat readiness of Army National Guard, Navy reserve air wing, and Marine combat units will be increased.

Allied military potential. From now on, assistance will be rendered to allies to increase their defense capability. For example, an agreement on joint production of the F-16 aircraft has been concluded to modernize the South Korean armed forces. In Southeast Asia, ties are being strengthened with partners and allies, joint maneuvers and exercises of combined forces are being conducted more frequently, and combat weapons and troops are being deployed beforehand. Allies and partners are being supplied with modern weaponry—M1A2 tanks, Patriot systems, etc.

Peacekeeping operations. In these operations, the United States will be opposed by a combination of regular and irregular forces equipped primarily with small arms and weapons systems of moderate complexity. In the majority of cases, U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations must be carried out jointly with the forces of other countries under the aegis of the UN or another international organization. It is advisable to provide for the participation of one airborne division, one light infantry division, one Marine Corps expeditionary brigade, 1-2 aircraft carrier battle groups, 1-2 mixed air wings, and also special forces units and support forces with a total strength of 50,000 men during a major armed intervention or in a peacekeeping operation.

The foreign presence. The need for a U.S. foreign military presence that is called upon to defend and guarantee American interests and security is taken into account when determining the strength of the general purpose forces.

In Europe, the United States intends to continue to play a leading role in a renewed NATO. They plan to maintain approximately 100,000 American troops here. U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft, units of two army divisions, and other support units and subunits will be part of the multinational crisis reaction forces that are being created. The U.S. Army will be part of two multinational corps along with German forces and they will be prepared to carry out rapid deployment missions outside Central Europe. The Air Force will provide aerial reconnaissance and airlift assets and all-weather strike aircraft and the Navy will continue patrolling in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and other areas of water adjacent to Europe.

They plan to maintain up to 100,000 troops in **North-east Asia**. From now on, the United States intends to help guarantee security in South Korea where one U.S. Army division and combat aviation subunits are deployed. American troop strength in South Korea is being maintained at the previous level with their modernization, just like with the modernization of South Korean troops.

Marine Corps expeditionary forces and a special Army battalion are located on Okinawa. The Aircraft Carrier Independence, the Assault Ship Belleau Wood and support ships have home ports at Japanese ports. Several combat aircraft subunits will remain in Japan and on Okinawa and the 7th Fleet will continue to patrol in the area assigned to it.

In **Southeast Asia**, they propose restricting themselves to a periodic shipment of American forces, without deploying them here on a permanent basis. The 4-6 Navy ships that have been patrolling the Persian Gulf since 1945 will continue their activities. They plan to deploy American weapons and equipment in Kuwait

and, possibly, in another area of the Arabian Peninsula. Several combat aircraft squadrons have remained in the Persian Gulf Region since the time of Operation Desert Storm.

In addition to the ships in the Diego Garcia area on which Marine Corps materiel is located, another seven ships with weapons and equipment for Army troops, the Navy and the Air Force will be deployed here.

In **Africa** from now on agreements will be utilized that provide the United States with access to key facilities and ports and that permit them to airlift and deploy American forces here. Furthermore, forces will be sent here when a threat to U.S. interests arises as it was in Liberia (Operation Sharp Edge) and Somalia (Restore Hope).

The U.S. armed forces in **Latin America** assist to strengthen trends toward strengthening democracy and will continue cooperation with the local armed forces and law enforcement organs to combat drug trafficking.

The naval presence. While considering the needs of the U.S. foreign presence, the Navy, specifically, aircraft carriers, will have to carry out missions that exceed those that could arise in the two major regional conflicts. In recent years, the United States supports a more or less continuous naval presence—as a rule, an aircraft carrier battle group and a group of amphibious assault ships—in the waters of Southeast Asia, North-east Asia and Europe. In the future, the presence of American aircraft carrier battle groups in these areas will not always be continuous. In aggregate, the approaches developed by the Department of Defense will ensure a balance between the possibility of the utilization of aircraft carriers and the deployment of other forces. While considering the flexibility of these approaches, the needs of the American strategy may be satisfied using a navy of 11 combat and one reserve (training) carriers.

The Strategic Nuclear Forces

Due to the change of the situation in the security sphere while planning the structure of the strategic nuclear forces, the United States is encountering numerous factors of uncertainty and complex missions. In light of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and also the conclusion of the START-1 and START-2 Treaties and the improvement of relations with Russia, the threat of a large-scale nuclear strike against the United States has become less real.

Nevertheless, tens of thousands of nuclear warheads remain on the territory of Russia and the three former Soviet republics. Even according to the START-2 Treaty, Russia will retain a large nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, despite reassuring trends, the political situation in Russia remains extremely uncertain.

Even with the ratification of the START-1 Treaty by Ukraine and the accession of Ukraine and Kazakhstan to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, realization of the planned reductions will take nearly 10 years. Thus, although the United States has already removed more than 3,500 warheads from ballistic missiles that are subject to elimination in accordance with the START-1 Treaty (approximately 90% of the required number), it will have to approach further reductions very prudently, while considering the existing factors of uncertainty.

Two primary missions define the U.S.'s future needs for strategic nuclear forces: to ensure effective deterrence, without exceeding the bounds of the START-1 and START-2 Treaties and to lay the foundations for the reconstitution of additional forces in the event of a threatening turn of events.

By the year 2003, the American strategic nuclear forces will include Trident nuclear submarines equipped with C-4 and D-5 ballistic missiles; Minuteman ICBM's, B-52H bombers equipped for cruise missiles, and B-2 bombers.

On the whole, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the U.S. armed forces according to the new national military organizational development plan (in contrast with the 1993 Fiscal Year that is concluding on 30 September) are shown in the table.

Forces	That Existed in the 1993 Fiscal Year	Proposed Based on the New National Military Organizational Development Plan
Total Strength of the U.S. Armed Forces	1,717,000	1,400,000
Army (Ground Forces)		
Army Division	14	10
National Guard Divisions	8	6
Navy		
Aircraft Carriers	13	12
Equivalent Air Wings (Active and Reserve)	11/2	10/1
Combatants	443	346
Air Force		
Equivalent Air Wings (Active and Reserve)	16/12	13/7
Marine Corps		
Total Strength	180,000	174,000
Strategic Nuclear Forces		
Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines	22	18
Heavy Bombers	201	up to 184
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles	787	500

Such is the primary content of the U.S. Department of Defense "Fundamental Review of the Structure of the Armed Forces" Report that lay at the foundation of the new national military organizational development plan that is essentially the military doctrine of the United States. This plan must still obtain the approval of Congress, where it will be submitted by Administration Head Bill Clinton.

SECURITY SERVICES

Notes: Border Control Issues

93UM0849A Moscow *POGRANICHNIK* in Russian
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[Notes under the rubric "Pulse of the Border," unattributed.]

[Text] By order of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin, the Transcaucasus Border District is disbanded. The Northern-Caucasus Border District will be formed on the basis of the latter's tactical formations and units, and will consist of the border troops of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, with district headquarters in the city of Stavropol. The Ministry of Security of Russia is instructed to establish the structure and manning of this district.

A press conference was held for Russian and foreign journalists in Moscow. Topics included the problems of development of the state border of Russia, and also the results of a visit by the leadership of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation to Alma-Ata, Dushanbe, and the Tajik-Afghan border.

As was noted by the Commander of the Border Troops of Russia, Col-Gen V.I. Shlyakhtin, the visit to Alma-Ata was very useful, eventful, interesting and effective. The Minister of Security of the Russian Federation, Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov, and the Chairman of the Committee of National Security of Kazakhstan, Bulat Abdrakhmanovich Bayekenov, signed two agreements. The first was on coordination of the border troops of Russia and Kazakhstan in guarding the external borders of these states. The second was on coordination of the operational organs of the border troops. This was followed by a brief visit to Tajikistan. The Minister of Security of the Russian Federation met with personnel of the Pyandzh border detachment, which is performing its duties in a very difficult situation. V.P. Barannikov carefully listened to all, and answered a number of questions. Then there were meetings with the command of the Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan and with the leadership of this republic.

Col-Gen V.I. Shlyakhtin described the situation on the state border of Russia in detail, recounted some of the results of the combat and working activities of the

border troops, and answered many questions of correspondents from newspapers, magazines, radio and television.

Participating in the press conference were the Chief of Administration of the Ministry of Security Lt-Gen V.A. Bondarenko, the Chief of the Public Liaison Center of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, Maj-Gen A.G. Chernenko, and leaders of subunits within the Apparatus of the Commander of Border Troops of Russia.

Questions of demarcation of the Russian-Chinese border in the Far East were considered at a meeting held in March at Khabarovsk, with participation of representatives of the Russian delegation of the joint Russian-Chinese demarcation commission, officials of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, deputy heads of administration of the Khabarovsk kray and the Jewish Autonomous and Amur oblasts, and representatives of the command of the Far Eastern Border and Military Districts. Practical implementation of the provisions of the Russian Chinese Treaty of May 16, 1991 on demarcation of the border between the two states will begin in April of this year and will take about five years.

On the Russian-Finnish border a meeting was held on 17 March between the Commander of the Border Troops of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Ivanovich Shlyakhtin, and the Chief of the Border Guards of Finland Lt-Gen Matti Autio. It summarized the results of cooperation of the border structures of the two countries last year and defined ways to improve them in the future. The meeting was held near the city of Vyborg, alternately on Russian and Finnish territories.

In March the withdrawal of the Prishib Border Detachment from Azerbaijan to its new garrison began. The division of weapons and military property was carried out without mutual recriminations. All requests of the Russian side associated with transport of cargoes and equipment, as well as the personal property of service members, were granted by representatives of the Azeri leadership.

The chairman of the Committee on Questions of Defense and Security of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS, S. Stepashin visited the Tajik-Afghan border at the end of March and was acquainted with the situation there. Based on the results of work of the special commission which he heads, new proposals will be worked out regarding reinforcement of the guard of this border by the collective forces of the CIS.

Enterprising dealers attempted to export licensed freight through the "Taman" port control post on a Ukrainian passenger boat—around two and a half tonnes of gasoline and construction materials worth a total of more than one and a half million rubles. This was prevented by soldiers of the Novorossiysk Border Detachment, who were working closely with customs officials and internal affairs organs.

The scheduled round of Russian-Georgian negotiations has concluded. At it, documents were developed regarding the principles of mutual relations of the two states, and the status and deadlines of temporary posting of units of the Russian Army and Border Troops on the territory of Georgia. In the words of the head of the Russian delegation F. Kovalev, only one question still remains unresolved, on the division of military property. A special commission will be formed which will study and find an agreement on this problem. The Russian delegation at the negotiations included the Deputy Commander of Border Troops of the Russian Federation, Maj-Gen A. Parakhin.

Using a false authorization for one-time transit of the border, the ranking NCO of a Mongolian border post, Gombosuren Tsodol, attempted to get into Russia. He was detained by his Russian colleagues, Transbaykal border troops.

A Kyrgyzian battalion sent earlier to reinforce the Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan has been withdrawn from the Gorno-Badakhshan oblast. Possibly, after a time, this or some other battalion will again participate in the provision of assistance to Russian border troops, this time on a contract basis. For the time being there is no law on contract service in Kyrgyzstan.

Anniversary ceremonies dedicated to the seventieth anniversary of the Red-Banner Border Detachment were held in Blagoveshchensk. Offering best wishes to the border troops at the ceremony were the Chairman of the Amur Oblast Council A. Belonogov, the Mayor of Blagoveshchensk Yu. Lyashkov, the garrison commander Maj-Gen Ye. Kusakin, border representatives from China, and workers of the oblast and city, and cultural and art figures.

At the "Leninakan" KPP [border crossing point] guard-post, Russian border guards detained a group of tourists from Yerevan. As was learned, the tourists were using the services of a Batumi cooperative, which instead of legally filling out the necessary documents, was simply forging passports with tourist visas.

Russian border guards, in accordance with agreements reached earlier at Russian-Georgian negotiations, are helping their Georgian colleagues with their professional development. Twenty-six border-guard officers of Georgia are now on temporary assignment as deputy chiefs of border guard subunits in Batumi and Achalchiche border detachments and controllers of the Batumi separate boarder crossing point [OKPP].

In an inspection of a large refrigerated fishing trawler arriving in St. Petersburg after a long voyage. Warrant Officer S. Balagura, senior member of the border detail, together with customs officials discovered 18 Italian small-caliber revolver and 2,100 rounds for them.

Border Troops Commander Nikolayev on Armed Conflict on Periphery

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[Interview with Andrey Ivanovich Nikolayev, deputy minister of security of the Russian Federation and commander of the Russian Federation Border Troops, by Oleg Falichev: "'Transparent' Borders—Not an Invention of Politicians"]

[Text]

Andrey Ivanovich Nikolayev

Born in Moscow 21 April 1949. Finished the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in 1971, the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze in 1976, and the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1988.

In June 1992, he became first deputy chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and, in December 1992, he became first deputy chief of the General Staff.

In August 1993, by edict of the president of Russia, he was appointed deputy minister of security of the Russian Federation and commander of the border troops of the Russian Federation.

He is married and has two sons.

[Falichev] Andrey Ivanovich, until recently you were first deputy chief of the General Staff. And now you have been appointed to the border troops. But there they have their own specific nature....

[Nikolayev] Well, in the first place, no one asked me. And, secondly, if a person serves in the army, he has no right to choose. The question was put this way: It is necessary for you to work there. That is about all there was to it.

As for the specific nature of our service, it is really enormous here. You noticed that I am already saying "our service." One other feature: It would seem that the company and the border post are similar concepts. But the border post is a more independent economic organism. I would say even a military-political organism, for the chief of the post is a commander, an economist, and a politician. We have many border posts in the border troops and no two are alike. Try to organize educational work on some pattern.

[Falichev] The readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA are well informed about the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. It is ambiguous and apparently you are analyzing it constantly and are coming to some conclusions....

[Nikolayev] This is indeed a very important problem. But have not journalists gotten stuck on this problem recently? Understand me correctly, the performance of

the service obligations of military people requires a certain amount of modesty. If we keep repeating that we are heroes, then this will have the opposite effect. I want to stress something else: Dozens of training centers and military commissariats are working to train soldiers and officers to perform their tasks in Tajikistan. The whole country is dealing with this problem. This is what everyone is forgetting.

Here people used to like to say: The nation and the army are unified. Nonsense. The army is the nation. If we are not part of the nation, then this is the tragedy of the army. Today, we must restore this umbilical cord between ourselves and the people as well as the destroyed system of military-patriotic education.

In this same Tajikistan, people demonstrated their best qualities under extreme conditions. Even those who were once reproached. What does this say? Our system of educational work in the country does not permit people to demonstrate these qualities in everyday life. We simply have not created the conditions under which a person can prove himself. Can one always expect combat operations? Thus, we need to change the very system of training and education so that the person can reveal himself as an individual.

And one other thing. Today, perhaps, it is incorrect to speak only of Russian border troops. At the present time, along with Russian border troops, there are subunits from Kazakhstan (283 men), Uzbekistan (190 men), and Kyrgyzstan (256 men) serving to protect the Tajik-Afghan border. This certainly must be considered.

[Falichev] I agree with you. But about a year ago, here, in Russia, people were making a lot of noise about building up our own borders. It now appears that we are returning to the old positions. Our border troops remain in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan.... How can this be explained?

[Nikolayev] The borders of the former Soviet Union were about 62,000 km in length, whereas those of Russia are 61,000 km long. If we are going to develop them the way we did before, then we will lose our pants, figuratively speaking. And is it necessary for us to develop them? With whom should we form a border—with Kazakhstan? Can you imagine a border with Kazakhstan, where so many Russians live? And with Ukraine and Belarus? I am firmly convinced that we must now follow a step behind our neighbors in everything with respect to sovereignty, borders, and the like. You understand that relations between our peoples developed over centuries. Why should there be a uniformed man with an assault rifle and dog between them?

No, this is not a return to the old system. We are realizing what to which our peoples have now come. Take that same Central Asian region. On 7 August, the presidents came together and said that there is a single common border of the Commonwealth in Central Asia and there are common strategic interests....

Nor can we forget about our strategic interests in the region beyond Kazakhstan and other regions. In short, the reliable guarding of the external borders of the former Soviet Union in the current stage corresponds to the common interests of the countries of the Commonwealth and the national interests of Russia. This makes it possible to leave the internal borders "transparent" to the movement of freight and commodities, especially if we are speaking of an economic union. A border is above all a question of politics and higher state interests. As for the economy, we are providing only 50 percent of the means for its protection. The other half comes from our partners. Is this advantageous? Certainly.

[Falichev] Do you not agree that there is a certain political risk in this, that everything will turn around in the future?

[Nikolayev] In the case at hand, the political decisions are being made for a very long time. Obviously it was simply necessary for all of us to suffer through our sovereignties.

[Falichev] In that case, it apparently would be possible to conclude that centrifugal processes are beginning to be replaced by centripetal processes.

[Nikolayev] I think that this is noticeable. The economy is sobering to all. But again, we are not hurrying the process. Everyone must come to this himself.

[Falichev] Still, many new sectors have appeared on the national border of Russia. What problems arose in this connection?

[Nikolayev] First of all let us specify what we mean by the term "new sectors." It is a matter of those sectors that have been given the status of a national border. In August 1992, subunits of the border troops began to guard the new frontiers. One must remember that at that time the military-political and operational situation was still complex. Its analysis indicated an increase in negative tendencies to the detriment of Russia's national security, and its political, economic, military, and territorial interests. On the border with the Baltic states, for example, there was a noticeable increase in contraband activities to bring nonferrous and rare-earth metals and industrial and food commodities out of Russia. In obtaining a significant profit from the sale of these products to individual private Baltic firms and state organizations, the smugglers are harming us economically. On this border alone, contraband has been confiscated with a total value of more than 1 billion rubles [R]. They prevented the removal of 954 tonnes of nonferrous metals and 381 tonnes of fuel and lubricants from the Russian Federation. They seized 155 kg of narcotic substances, 49 firearms, and 254,000 pieces of ammunition.

According to calculations made by west German experts, in 1992 alone Russia suffered a loss of \$10-15 billion from the illegal outflow of hard currency to

other countries. In connection with the undiminished "inflows" of Russian nickel, there has even been a surplus supply of it in the West European market. By the beginning of 1993, reserves of nickel in the London Metals Exchange increased to 66,000 tonnes, whereas a year before that they amounted to only 12,000 tonnes.

These are clearly impressive figures. But the smugglers are not sitting by idly. There have recently been attempts by organized criminal groups operating in the territory of contiguous states as well as our own to transfer metals across the borders to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is possible from an analysis of the existing situation to infer that with an increase in border and customs controls organized mafia structures will find new ways to smuggle nonferrous and rare-earth metals out of Russia or to obtain permits through various ways for their export by official means. It appears that later on there will also be attempts at armed penetration of the borders for the same purpose.

It is obvious that economic security as the supporting structure of our society requires the existence of a complex mechanism of economic, political, and legal measures to guarantee the national interests of the state. The border troops alone cannot resist the strategic damage inflicted from the positions of illegal activities in the country as a whole. For this reason, it clearly must be a matter of a single concept for the economic policy of Russia.

[Falichev] What are the dynamics today of the arrest of border violators? Could you name some figures?

[Nikolayev] On the average, every month the Russian border troops arrest up to 400 violators. The largest number of them violate the borders with Finland, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and China. In the northwest sector, most of those detained are citizens of third countries, mostly from states in Southeast Asia, North Africa, and the Near and Middle East, who are trying to use the territory of the Russian Federation to get to the West illegally.

In 1993, the border troops of the Russian Federation arrested 2,473 border violators. With what purpose do the people cross the border? If you take the contiguous countries, the border was violated for these reasons: 112 persons in search of better living conditions, 452 for economic and domestic purposes, 507 to conclude contraband deals, and 295 for other purposes.

[Falichev] Could you say how much the national border costs our taxpayers?

[Nikolayev] In the first eight months of 1993, the border troops of the Russian Federation received about R120 billion for their support. These funds provided only for the payment of monetary allowances and wages as well as the vital needs of the troops.

[Falichev] Today attention is obviously being paid to the material needs of the armed forces and border troops. However there is no lessening of the striving of officers, especially young officers, to abandon the ranks of the armed forces. It is even increasing in some places. In my view, this problem cannot be solved simply by increasing monetary support. The solution is seen in an entire complex of measures, where first place belongs to the educating of patriots under Russian traditions.

[Nikolayev] I fully agree with you. For what is happening right now? The border troops of the Russian Federation, in performing their tasks in an exceptionally complex and dynamic situation, are experiencing an increasing shortage of conscripts and officers. As of today the shortfall of officers here amounts to more than 7,000 people and that of conscript servicemen is about 20,000.

We are observing a decline in the intellectual potential of border troops, which inevitably leads to a decline in the level of professional training and, as a result, of combat readiness. Therefore, the following measures have been taken by the administrative staff of the commander of the border troops for the purpose of doing away with the shortfall of officers in the troops:

- the higher border schools have been reorganized into military institutes of the border forces;
- a third higher educational institution for the border troops of Russia has been opened (the Kabarovsk Military Institute);
- specific training of Suvorovtsy (children of border troops on the basis of the Suvorov Military School in Ulyanovsk) has been organized.

But questions on the social protection of servicemen, especially those serving in "hot spots," are still being resolved rather slowly. More than 7,000 of our officers and warrant officers, for example, do not have apartments....

Still, the people are not losing heart but are steadfastly enduring the difficulties. For example, recently I went on a trip to the Caucasus. I will not deny that we heard such questions as this from some officers: "Comrade commander, some cooperatives are now paying as much as 500,000 and some want to go." I say, "What

can you do?" "They will leave. There is nothing you can do." "But why", I ask, "did you not leave?" "How, comrade commander, I am a border guard", he answers. So not everyone will go for that, although somewhere, possibly, things really are better and they pay more. But why do they not leave? Because not everything can be bought. Fortunately not everything is sold in Russia.

[Falichev] But you must agree that one clearly cannot endlessly exploit the idea of patriotism in our soldiers and their best moral qualities. You cannot always take and not give anything in return.

[Nikolayev] Precisely this is the role of the agencies for military administration and the Ministry of Defense as a whole: A clear recognition of the situation, in which morale measures must be supplemented opportunely by material measures. If military service is needed by the state, then it must be assessed not only in terms of morale, so that a man with shoulder straps will not be thinking about a piece of bread but will dedicate himself fully to his service.

[Falichev] And one final question, Andrey Ivanovich. According to reports in the mass media, a process has now begun in the Far East of transferring parts of so-called disputed territories to China. What is the role of the border troops in this and are such actions on the border always coordinated with you?

[Nikolayev] The border troops in their everyday work and, above all, in their border representation actions on the national border are in constant contact with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Questions involving the national border and its regime are coordinated with the leadership of the border troops. In August 1992, a Russian delegation was organized in a joint Russian-Chinese demarcation commission headed by special ambassador G.V. Kireyev, in the work of which officers of the border troops are participating along with representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense as well as representatives of border oblasts and krais. The results of the demarcation work will determine to whom particular islands belong.

In conclusion, I will say that our border troops have never forgotten and will not forget about their special mission—the implementation of the Russian state's foreign policy.

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